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ORDINARY CAUSATION: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
JAMES A. MACLEOD*
In a series of recent split decisions interpreting criminal and tort-like legislation, 
the Supreme Court has purported to give statutory causation requirements their 
ordinary, plain meaning. Armed with dictionaries, examples from everyday speech, 
and commonsense intuitions, the Court’s majority has explained that statutory 
phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-for causation as a matter of 
ordinary usage. There’s just one problem: The Court’s majority (and the many state 
and federal courts following its lead) is wrong on the facts—specifically, the facts 
about how people ordinarily interpret, understand, and use causal language.
This Article considers a novel approach to ordinary meaning statutory 
interpretation, using these recent causation cases as a proof of concept: To find how 
people would ordinarily construe statutory language in context, ask a lot of people 
to apply the disputed language, and observe what they do. In short, to find public 
meaning, ask the public. As a demonstration, the Article reports the results of a 
nationally representative survey of nearly 1500 jury-eligible laypeople. It tests the 
Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements about the ordinary meaning of causal 
language in Title VII, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the Controlled Substances 
Act, and jury instructions in similar criminal and statutory tort settings. The results 
reveal clear and consistent patterns of causal attribution and ordinary usage
—patterns that squarely contradict the Court’s ordinary meaning determinations. 
The results also demonstrate that certain alternative causation standards, though 
rejected by the Court as inconsistent with ordinary linguistic, conceptual, and moral 
intuitions, come closer to tracking all three.
These discoveries raise serious concerns about the outcomes in recent criminal 
and tort causation cases, and possibly about ordinary and plain meaning 
interpretation more broadly. After discussing the implications for causation doctrine 
and statutory interpretation, the Article considers whether similar experimental 
methodologies might shed light on additional interpretation controversies in 
criminal and tort settings, on theories of common law doctrinal development, and on 
philosophical analyses of causation in criminal and tort theory.
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INTRODUCTION
Statutory interpretation cases sometimes turn on the plain, ordinary meaning of 
everyday words. A series of recent split Supreme Court decisions concerning 
causation is representative. Armed with dictionaries, thought experiments, intuition-
pumping examples from everyday speech, and common sense, the Court’s majority 
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has explained that statutory phrases like “because of” and “results from” entail but-
for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. So, for example, employment 
discrimination plaintiffs alleging that they were fired “because of” a discriminatory 
motive under various provisions of Title VII must show that the employer would not 
have fired them absent the unlawful consideration.1 Otherwise, as a matter of 
“common talk” and “ordinary meaning,” we would not say that they were fired 
“because of” the unlawful consideration.2 Similarly, in applying the words of the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) according to their plain, ordinary meaning, we
would not say that a drug user’s death “result[ed] from” a drug sold by the defendant 
if, absent that drug, he would have died at the same time anyway from the other drugs 
he had taken.3 Again, this is simply a matter of “the common understanding of 
cause,” and what “is natural to say” about causal relations.4
The stakes of these ordinary meaning debates are high. Most obviously, the 
statutory causation standard in the cases described above matters for discrimination 
plaintiffs and for criminal defendants accused of selling deadly products. But the 
Court’s ordinary meaning pronouncements reverberate far beyond the particular 
statutes they explicitly address because similar causal language appears throughout 
federal and state codes, in a wide range of substantive settings, and courts often 
follow the Supreme Court’s lead in importing ordinary meaning determinations from 
one statute to another without regard to context. As the Fifth Circuit explained in a 
recent Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) case, “[t]he Court in 
Burrage [the CSA case described above] was interpreting a drug crime statute,” but 
the “word ‘results’ retains its ordinary meaning, regardless of whether it appears in 
Title 21 or Title 29 of the United States Code.”5
                                                                                                                
1. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
2. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64, 
n.14 (2007)); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362 (emphasizing “the plain textual meaning[] of the word 
‘because’”). But see Gross, 557 U.S. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 190 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014).  
4. Id. at 211−12; see also id. at 213 (discussing additional examples of statutory phrases 
that entail but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage). But see id. at 219 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (noting “room for debate” regarding the meaning of “results from” and concurring 
on grounds of lenity).
5. Tolbert v. RBC Capital Markets Corp., 758 F.3d 619, 624–25 n.4 (5th Cir. 2014); see 
also, e.g., Changzhou Trina Solar Energy Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 879 F.3 1377, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (relying on Burrage in interpreting federal provision levying duties on imports 
where “domestic industry was, in the statutory phrase, ‘materially injured . . . by reason of
imports’” (emphasis added)); United States v. Yihao Pu, 814 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(federal fraud sentencing enhancement guidelines provision); United States v. Alphas, 785 
F.3d 775, 783 (1st Cir. 2015) (same); Annex Med., Inc. v. Burwell, 769 F.3d 578, 584–85 (8th 
Cir. 2014) (Colloton, J., concurring) (for purposes of federal regulation, if “unavailability of 
a group health plan without the objected-to coverage is ‘a result of the Mandate,’ then it 
follows in ordinary usage that the Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate is a but-for 
cause of the desired plan’s unavailability.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramos-
Delgado, 763 F.3d 398, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2014) (federal sentencing guidelines provision);
Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., LLC, 755 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2014) (federal Jury System 
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And in addition to these transsubstantive effects, the transprocedural effects of 
the Court’s ordinary meaning pronouncements raise the stakes further still. For 
example, after Burrage, courts increasingly approve jury instructions that parrot the 
statute’s “results from” language but include no explicit but-for causation instruction. 
After all, “[a]s the Supreme Court made clear in Burrage, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of 
‘results from’ is that the outcome or harm would not have occurred were it not for 
the defendant’s conduct. . . . The jury could have relied on its general understanding 
of the phrase ‘results from.’”6 Indeed, as another court explained, a but-for causation 
instruction would be redundant: “Generally understood words of ordinary usage need 
not be defined . . . . We are convinced [that] the term[] . . . ‘resulted’ . . . [is] readily 
understood by the layperson and [is] not [a] technical or legal term[] requiring further 
definition.”7 In short, as these and many other decisions assure us,8 juries convicting 
                                                                                                                
Improvement Act); McNely v. Ocala Star–Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(construing the Americans with Disabilities Act’s causal language according to “the ordinary, 
everyday meaning” of causation); Micks v. Gurstel Law Firm, P.C., No. 17-cv-4659, 2019 
WL 418850, at *11–12 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2019) (relying on Burrage’s analysis of the ordinary 
meaning of “results from” for purposes of interpreting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act’s 
use of the same phrase); Kemply v. Cashcall, Inc., No. 08-cv-03174-MEJ, 2016 WL 1055251, 
at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2016) (Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act); People v. Nere, 82
N.E.3d 730, 730 (Ill. Ct. App. 2017) (state homicide statute); Commonwealth v. Kakhankham, 
132 A.3d 986, 992−93 & n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (state sentencing statute); Goree v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 490 S.W.3d 413, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (relying on plain meaning of 
“because of” for purposes of retaliation claims under Tennessee Human Rights Act); Wagoner 
v. Commonwealth, 756 S.E.2d 165, 175–76 (Va. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 770 S.E.2d 479 (Va. 
2015) (“We are persuaded by Burrage that, where the [Virginia] legislature has not clarified 
otherwise, this Court should give the phrase ‘results in’ its ordinary meaning, which imports 
‘but for’ causation.”);  cf. City of W. Liberty v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., No. 16-1972, 2018 
WL 1182764, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018) (relying on Burrage’s pronouncements 
concerning the “ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘results from’” to construe insurance 
contract’s use of the same phrase to entail but-for causation). But see United States ex rel.
Greenfield v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 880 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that the phrase 
“resulting from” in the federal Anti-Kick Back Statute is “arguably not plain,” and a but-for 
causation requirement would produce “incongruous results” under the statute).
6. United States v. Thomas, No. 7:10CR00016, 2016 WL 1070868, at *4 (W.D. Va. 
Mar. 16, 2016) (citations omitted). A similar transprocedural effect occurs where courts 
interpret defendants’ factual admissions in written plea agreements and verbal plea colloquies. 
See, e.g., Donavan v. United States, No. 14-1310, 2016 WL 424946, at *8 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 
2016) (explaining that defendant’s admission, prior to Burrage, that the drug he sold “caused” 
death, constituted an admission that the drug was a but-for cause of that death and thus satisfied 
the causation requirement articulated in Burrage), vacated on other grounds, 865 F.3d 472 
(7th Cir. 2017).
7. State v. Knight, No. 150568, 2016 WL 3269596, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 248, 252 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 492 (2016); Linder v. Kreuger, No. 1:15−cv−01055−SLD, 2017 WL 
5011879, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2017); Hancock v. United States, Nos. 2:08-CR-75-JRG-
DHI, 2:13-CV-252-JRG, 2016 WL 4290468, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2016); Doyle v. 
United States, No. 14−0364−DRH, 2015 WL 2106179, at *3 (S.D. Ill. May 4, 2015); Smith v. 
Wilson, No. 14−CV−0510 (PJS/HB), 2014 WL 5489244, at *2, *8 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2014);
Knight, 2016 WL 3269596, at *7; see also United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 146 (3d 
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defendants under the CSA’s “death results from” provision, which carries a 
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years, are using a but-for causation 
standard, because the phrase “results from” plainly entails but-for causation as a 
matter of ordinary language and common sense. The Supreme Court, after all, has
said so.9
There’s just one problem: in these and other similar cases, the Court’s majority 
(like the many other courts following its lead) was wrong on the facts—specifically, 
the facts about how people ordinarily think and talk about causation. The majority 
was wrong, in other words, about the ordinary and allegedly plain meaning of these 
statutes’ language, and about the “commonsense” concept of causation that language 
invoked. 
But how could we know? The answer is surprisingly simple: ask a lot of people 
to apply these same phrases and concepts in context and observe what they do. In
other words, to find public meaning, ask the public.10
                                                                                                                
Cir. 2012) (“‘[B]ecause’ is a word with an ordinary meaning. As a result, the addition of a 
clarifying definition—as proposed by the Defendants—was not necessary to the jury’s
understanding of the instructions it received.”); United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 949 
(7th Cir. 2010) (upholding undefined statutory “results from” instruction because the ordinary 
meaning was “clear enough” and explaining that “[e]laborating on a term often makes it less 
rather than more clear”); cf. Knight, 2016 WL 3269596, at *7; Thomas, 2016 WL 1070868, at 
*4; Czimmer v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1054 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (holding that 
the jury charge’s “substantial factor” causation instruction was not erroneous because it 
clarified that “substantial factor” was synonymous with “factual cause,” and the plain meaning 
of the phrase “factual cause” entails but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage). But see
United States v. Schneider, 112 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (D. Kan. 2015) (holding error not 
harmless where jury instruction did not define statutory “results from” language); United 
States v. MacKay, 20 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1294 (D. Utah 2014), aff’d, 610 F. App’x 797 (10th 
Cir. 2015) (same). 
9. Of the cases cited above, Alvarado may be the most remarkable. There, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the jury’s conviction after the jury had asked the trial court judge twice during 
deliberation “whether ‘death resulted from the use of the heroin’ means solely from the use of 
heroin, or that heroin ‘contributed to [the deceased’s] death.’” Alvarado, 816 F.3d at 248, 252
(emphasis in original). The trial judge had responded to both written notes by simply telling 
the jury to continue deliberating. As the Fourth Circuit explained in upholding the conviction, 
“[t]he Burrage Court held that ‘results from’ in [the CSA] invokes the ‘ordinary, accepted 
meaning’ of the phrase. And the ordinary meaning of ‘results from’ is but-for causation
—i.e., that death would not have occurred in the absence of heroin.” Id. at 248.
10. A note regarding terminology: the Article uses “ordinary meaning” and “public 
meaning” interchangeably. See Victoria F. Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK.
L. REV. 997, 1004 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 480 (2013). Unless otherwise noted, in this Article both refer to 
what scholars sometimes call “communicative content” or “audience meaning” and, for the 
most part, also track what scholars sometimes call “linguistic meaning,” “semantic meaning,” 
and “contextual meaning.” See BRIAN SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4–8 (2015); Richard H. Fallon Jr., The 
Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015). 
As will hopefully become apparent in Parts I–III, this Article’s construal of “ordinary 
meaning” is not an arbitrary stipulation; rather, it reflects the concept of ordinary meaning that 
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That is the approach this Article proposes and demonstrates in action. The Article 
reports the results of a nationally representative survey of nearly 1500 jury-eligible 
laypeople. As it turns out, most people do not interpret common causal phrases to 
imply but-for causation, even in the linguistic and factual contexts at issue in these 
and similar cases. In fact, for example, most people would say that the drug user’s 
death “resulted from” his use of the drug at issue, even if he still would have died 
from other drugs without it. And most people would say that an employer who fires 
an employee for multiple reasons, only one of which is unlawful, fired the employee 
“because of” the unlawful reason, even where the alternative benign motivations 
were sufficient in themselves to cause the firing. Furthermore, most people would 
express a great deal of confidence in claiming that these statutory causation 
requirements are satisfied, even while simultaneously (and confidently) 
acknowledging that but-for causation is absent.11 And in doing so, they would not be 
merely expressing antipathy toward discriminatory employers, drug dealers, and the 
like; instead, they would be using their commonsense understanding of causation. 
(For example, most would interpret and apply these causation requirements in the 
same way in contexts nearly identical to the cases described above, but subtly altered 
to eliminate the impulse to morally blame or punish.)12
In addition to the above findings, the survey reveals that some alternative 
causation standards rejected by the Court’s majority come closer to tracking ordinary 
usage (and, independently, assessments of moral blameworthiness) than does the 
majority’s “but-for” test, while other alternative standards favored by some courts 
and commentators fare even worse. Specifically, the “substantial factor” standard for 
causation comes much closer to tracking common sense and statutory causality 
attribution than does the “but-for” test, the “contributing factor” test, or the “sole 
factor” test, and the sufficiency of the relevant “cause” is more predictive of causality 
attribution (and blameworthiness assessments) than the Court’s “but-for” standard.13
One final finding may help put the rest into perspective. While the Court 
majority’s “commonsense” concept of causation appears far less common than the 
Court majority seemed to think, there’s an important respect in which both the 
                                                                                                                
courts themselves typically appear to invoke in the relevant case law, as evidenced by (1) what 
courts explicitly say about their conception of “ordinary meaning” (e.g., that it is reflective of 
how ordinary people ordinarily talk), (2) what evidence courts turn to in order to find it (e.g., 
nonlegal dictionaries and examples from everyday speech), (3) what courts say about their 
reasons for caring about ordinary meaning (e.g., it shows what notice the public received), and 
(4) what inferences courts draw based on ordinary meaning determinations (e.g., if a meaning 
is ordinary then it is the meaning reasonable juries are lost likely to presume absent further 
instruction). See infra Parts I–III; cf. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of 
Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1134 (2017). On similar construal of “ordinary 
meaning” in scholarly statutory interpretation literature, see SLOCUM, supra, at ch. 2
(surveying scholarly literature concerning ordinary meaning in interpretation). On the 
meaning of “plain meaning,” i.e., “obvious” or “clear” meaning, and the “plain meaning rule,” 
see William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
539, 541 (2017) (“The plain meaning rule says that otherwise-relevant information about 
statutory meaning is forbidden when the statutory text is plain or unambiguous.”). 
11. Infra Section IV.B.3.a.
12. Infra Section IV.B.3.c.
13. Infra Section IV.B.3.b.
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majority and dissenting Justices—along with the many other judges and legal 
theorists similarly divided over these issues—appear to share the survey participants’ 
outlook: nearly everyone thinks that his or her own interpretation is shared by most 
people, even when it is not.14
In light of these findings, the Article considers the role survey experiments might 
usefully play in reconsidering the causation standards addressed in recent statutory 
tort and criminal case law15 (including, most immediately, in cases approving jury 
instructions premised on the Court’s misleading pronouncements about ordinary 
meaning and causation).16 The Article goes on to consider the role such experimental 
                                                                                                                
14. Infra Section IV.B.3.d. 
15. In arguing for the relevance of experimental methodologies in legal interpretation, the 
Article builds on important recent work advocating the use of surveys and experiments in 
contract interpretation. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting 
Contracts Via Surveys and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753 (2017). Ben-Shahar and 
Strahilevitz convincingly demonstrate that lay survey respondents are capable of providing 
reliable and consistent interpretations of vague language in consumer contracts. Id. at 1766–
1801. 
But to be clear, while Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz advocate fully “outsourcing” or 
“delegating” to survey participants the determination of contractual meaning—thereby 
effectively “oust[ing] interpretations based on non-textual approaches,” id. at 1802, 1808–
09—the present Article does not argue for an analogous wholesale outsourcing approach to 
statutory meaning determinations, nor does it argue in favor of ridding statutory interpretation 
of “non-textual” considerations. (Indeed, this Article does not contend that “textualist” 
considerations like ordinary and plain meaning ought to receive any greater weight than they 
already receive vis-à-vis “non-textual” sources of statutory meaning. See, e.g., infra Section 
IV.C. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons,
113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013); Fallon, supra note 10.)
In any event, although this Article is to my knowledge the first published piece to argue 
for the relevance of experimental methodologies in statutory interpretation, an excellent 
unpublished student paper argues for the use of surveys to find ordinary meaning. See J.P. 
Sevilla, Measuring Ordinary Meaning Using Surveys (Sept. 10, 2014) (unpublished working 
paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466667 [https://perma.cc/CPX3-27QX]. That paper, unlike 
Ben-Shahar and Strahilevitz’s article and unlike this Article, does not use an experimental 
design to test survey respondents’ sensitivity to alterations in the language being interpreted. 
See infra Sections IV.B.1–3; Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz at 1766–1801. And an early review 
of Larry Solan’s The Language of Judges includes discussion of a survey questionnaire 
administered to 116 university students and thirty-seven judges for purposes of interpreting 
the word “enterprise” as used in the federal RICO statute. Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. 
Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J.
1561, 1598–1601 (1994) (concluding that the term is ambiguous in certain respects relevant 
to interpretation of the relevant statutory provision).
More generally, in arguing for the relevance of empirical methods in legal interpretation, 
this Article builds on the recent and rapidly expanding literature concerning law and corpus 
linguistics. See infra Section III.B. Although this Article is somewhat critical of certain aspects 
of that literature, it shares that literature’s goal of rendering judicial claims about ordinary and 
plain meaning less suppositious and more readily amenable to constructive and transparent 
debate.
16. See, e.g., cases discussed supra notes 6−9 and accompanying text (relying on Burrage 
to uphold CSA convictions premised on jury instructions lacking explicit but-for instructions).
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evidence might play in resolving other interpretive disputes that arise in criminal and 
tort law more generally (e.g., in applying substantive canons and interpretive 
doctrines like lenity and void-for-vagueness, as well as standards for reasonable 
mistake of law excuses and qualified immunity).17
While the idea of treating survey experiments like the ones reported here as 
relevant in tort and criminal litigation may initially seem like a radical departure from 
current legal practice, it is worth noting that the use of such experiments in these 
areas is already more common than many realize, though it goes on entirely behind 
closed doors: in mass torts, products liability, and white-collar and corporate criminal 
matters, wealthy and repeat-player litigants and their firms sometimes undertake and 
collect survey-based research (the results of which are nonpublic and confidential) 
for their own use in making strategic decisions from forum selection and settlement 
through trial and jury instruction proposals.18 These litigants are thus able to observe, 
for example, how people interpret statutory causation language compared to “but-
for,” “contributing factor,” and “substantial factor” causation instructions.19 In short, 
then, survey-based empirical research already plays a role in shaping litigation even 
in the context of statutory causation requirements, just not necessarily a visible role 
or one that benefits most litigants.20 To slightly revise the slogan form of this 
Article’s approach: to find public meaning, ask the public—then make the results 
public.
Moving from legal practice to theory, the Article argues that legal theorists and 
philosophers, like judges and litigants, can usefully draw on empirical data 
concerning ordinary language and common intuitions. First, experimental research 
concerning concepts like “causation,” “reasonableness,” etc. can help flesh out 
prominent theoretical accounts of common law adjudication associated with 
American Legal Realism, on the one hand, and self-styled New Doctrinalists on the 
other.21 Second, similar empirical data can usefully aid in the philosophical analysis 
of legal concepts, at least as such analysis is conducted in much of modern analytic 
                                                                                                                
17. See infra Section V.A. 
18. Interviews with Anonymous Jury and Trial Consultants and Anonymous Lawyers 
(2016–2017) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interviews]. To be sure, one frequent use 
of survey data in litigation is publicly visible and well known: in several substantive areas of 
law, most prominently trademarks and unfair competition cases concerning consumer 
confusion, parties routinely present survey evidence to the court via expert witnesses. See Ben-
Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15. 
19. See Interviews, supra note 18.
20. There is surprisingly little publicly available information about the methods and 
practices of jury and trial consulting firms. The few scholarly treatments of the topic focus 
exclusively on jury consultants’ role in selecting individual jurors during voir dire. See
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935 (2016); Franklin 
Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting 
Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, To Do About It, 1999 WISC. L.
REV. 441. As is apparent from publicly available business profiles, these firms are already 
numerous and oft-used, and they continue to grow as big data technologies become cheaper 
and more informative. In any event, it is no secret that these firms provide services—often 
including sophisticated empirical research—that litigants and firms use to make strategic 
litigation decisions far beyond voir dire. 
21. See infra Section V.B.
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legal philosophy.22 For example, despite many important differences, the two 
preeminent modern philosophical works on causation in torts and criminal law
—H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré’s Causation in the Law, and Michael Moore’s 
Causation and Responsibility23—both frequently appeal to allegedly common 
linguistic, conceptual, and moral intuitions to support their arguments (often using 
the same sorts of intuition-pumping examples from ordinary language that permeate 
modern statutory interpretation case law).24 Philosophers’ contentions regarding 
common intuitions, like judges’, ought to be tested using a larger sample size than 
the author him- or herself. And here again, although conducting experiments might 
initially sound like a radical departure from current practice, it is more common in 
contemporary philosophy than many realize,25 even if it is not (yet) common in 
philosophy of law.26
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines recent case law concerning the 
ordinary meaning of statutory causation language and the “commonsense,” or “folk,” 
concept27 of causation. Parts II and III, while continuing to use these cases as 
illustrative examples, address two more fundamental issues underlying courts’ 
ordinary meaning interpretation. Part II explains why courts do, should, and 
inevitably must care about ordinary meaning in legal interpretation, especially in 
criminal and tort law, and especially in construing core common law concepts like 
causation. Part III then examines how judges ascertain the ordinary meaning of 
statutory language and the ordinary conceptual understandings it reflects. Judges’ 
usual tools—introspection, intuition-pumping examples, and dictionaries, as well as 
                                                                                                                
22. See infra Section V.C.
23. H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); MICHAEL MOORE,
CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY (2009); cf. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 
(2014) (citing HART & HONORÉ, supra, at 104).
24. See, e.g., infra notes 308–10.
25. For a general introduction, see Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, Experimental 
Philosophy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2017).
26. See Alex Langlinais & Brian Leiter, The Methodology of Legal Philosophy, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY (H. Cappelen, T. Gendler & J. 
Hawthorne eds., 2013); BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN 
LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 4 (2007) [hereinafter LEITER,
NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE]; cf. Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Three 
Approaches, in THE FUTURE OF NATURALISM 9 (J. Shook & P. Kurtz eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Leiter, Three Approaches].
27. By “concept” and “folk concept,” I mean what Richard Fallon, following Frank 
Jackson, meant by it, as explained in Fallon, supra note 10: “[T]he term ‘concept’ refers to 
‘the possible situations covered by the words we use to ask our questions.’ . . . A folk concept, 
roughly speaking, is one rooted in the understandings and usages of ordinary people. This 
assumption makes linguistic intuitions relevant because ‘[i]n as much as [one’s] intuitions are 
shared by the folk, they reveal the folk theory’ that presumptively defines a folk concept’s 
extension.” Id. at 1254 n.66 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting FRANK 
JACKSON, FROM METAPHYSICS TO ETHICS: A DEFENCE OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 33, 37 
(1998)). 
Importantly, I adopt that account because it tracks what the courts, in the decisions 
discussed below and elsewhere, appear to adopt when they discuss “ordinary,” 
“commonsense” concepts, including factual causation.   
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recently proposed corpus linguistics methodologies—all run into serious problems 
of bias, inaccuracy, and indeterminacy. Part IV therefore proposes the survey 
experiment method, explains why it holds promise as an improvement over other 
traditional methods, and demonstrates it in action. It shows that courts have often 
reached the wrong outcomes (according to their own stated ordinary language 
criteria) in recent statutory causation case law. The Article then briefly considers 
possible explanations for why they arrived at the particular wrong answers they 
reached, and what normative lessons we might draw with respect to causation 
doctrine and with respect to textualist statutory interpretation more broadly. Part V 
considers further implications and potential extensions of the experimental 
methodology.
I. COURTS ON THE FOLK CONCEPT OF CAUSATION AND ORDINARY USAGE
Section I.A will provide a brief survey of a series of recent cases construing 
statutory causation requirements. In these cases, the Supreme Court (and other state 
and federal courts following its lead) has consistently found that the ordinary, plain 
meaning of causal language, and the common, everyday concept of causation it 
invokes, entails but-for causation.28 But while the Justices in the majority derived 
this conclusion from seemingly commonsense intuitions about the folk concept of 
causation, intuition-pumping examples of uncontroversial everyday linguistic usage, 
and dictionary definitions objectively attesting to the ordinary meaning of the 
relevant statutory language, some other courts and commentators (as well as some 
dissenting Justices) have derived a variety of contrary conclusions from many of 
these same resources. Section I.B therefore examines a few types of cases that 
arguably pose problems for the Court’s but-for entailment thesis. It then briefly 
describes three alternative causation tests that various courts and commentators
—despite disagreeing amongst themselves about the proper scope and interpretation 
of each test—nonetheless claim more closely track the folk concept of causation and 
the ordinary meaning of causal language than does the Court’s but-for test.
A. The Triumph of the But-For Test in Recent Ordinary Meaning Case Law
1. Statutory Torts
Mixed-motivation discrimination cases, concerning what courts and scholars 
often label “statutory torts,”29 comprise some of the Supreme Court’s most important 
                                                                                                                
28. More specifically, in these cases the Court has held that this language entails at least 
but-for causation. These cases concern “factual” causation (as opposed to “proximate” or 
“legal” causation) as does this Article except where otherwise noted. For an examination of 
recent statutory case law concerning ordinary meaning and proximate causation requirements, 
see Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1199 (2013).
29. See Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1431, 1431 (2012) (“Title VII is often described as a ‘statutory tort’ . . . .”); W. Jonathan 
Cardi, The Role of Negligence Duty Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases, 75 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1129, 1129 (2014) (“The tortification of employment discrimination law has been 
thoroughly documented and theorized.”) (citing examples); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label,
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ordinary meaning causation cases. “Motive,” at least as the courts have consistently 
treated it, “is a causal concept”30: it concerns somebody’s reason for acting—i.e.,
something that made them decide to (caused them to) do something. Causal language 
comprises some of the most consequential clauses of Title VII,31 the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),32 the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA),33 the Fair Housing Act (FHA),34 and other modern anti-discrimination and 
civil rights laws.35
Consider the ADEA, which makes it unlawful to, inter alia, discharge an 
employee “because of” the employee’s age. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the 
Supreme Court held that the term “because of” in the ADEA entails “but-for” 
causation.36 In other words, to prevail on an age discrimination claim, plaintiffs must 
show that, but for the employer’s consideration of the employee’s age, the employer 
would not have discharged the employee. In so holding, the Court’s opinion focused 
entirely on “the ordinary meaning” of the phrase “because of.”37
To support its ordinary meaning determination, the Gross Court first turned to 
dictionaries, quoting two definitions of the phrase “because of” (each of which 
included among its definitions “by reason of” and “on account of,”)38 as well as one 
definition of the word “because” (defined as “by reason; on account”).39 In light of 
these definitions, the Court explained, “[T]he plain language of the ADEA” (i.e., the 
phrase “because of”) requires that age be “the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s 
adverse decision.”40 The opinion next turned to the Court’s own precedent 
interpreting the ordinary meaning of similar causal language found in other statutes 
across various substantive contexts, observing, for example, that, “[i]n common talk, 
the phrase ‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship,” and that “based on” 
                                                                                                                
66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1070 (2014). For more on civil rights and discrimination law as statutory 
torts, see, e.g., the Ohio State Law Journal’s recent symposium: Martha Chamallas & Sandra 
F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and Conflict, 75 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1021
(2014).
30. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment 
Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 739 (1987); see also Andrew 
Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1117 (2018) (stating that 
in mixed motive case law, the “causation-focused approach,” i.e., “tort causation analysis, the 
notion that plaintiffs must show that their injury was caused by the defendant’s illicit 
motives[,] has been terrifically influential” (emphasis in original)).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2012).
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
35. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 5–9, infra note 47; sources cited supra notes 29–30, 
infra note 69.
36. 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009).
37. Id. at 175–76.
38. Id. at 176 (quoting 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966); 
1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1933)).
39. Id. (quoting THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132
(1966)).
40. Id.
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has the same ordinary meaning as “because of.”41 In short, as a matter of ordinary 
understanding and linguistic usage, the phrase “because of” entails but-for causation, 
and the ADEA therefore does too.42
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, the Court 
“returned again to the meaning of ‘because,’” here addressing Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision.43 As in Gross, where the Court had “[c]oncentrat[ed] first and 
foremost on the meaning of the phrase ‘because of’” in ordinary usage, the Court 
again considered, among other things, the “‘plain textual meaning’ of the word 
‘because’”44 and claimed that it entails but-for causation,45 citing the earlier plain 
meaning causation cases on which the Gross Court relied.46
And Gross and Nassar are just the tip of the iceberg: In cases concerning the 
ADA, the FHA, and numerous other “statutory torts,” federal circuit courts—relying 
on their own intuitions, along with the occasional dictionary definition—have 
likewise determined that terms like “because” and “because of” entail but-for 
                                                                                                                
41. Id. (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 & n.14 (2007)); see 
also id. (quoting Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 652−55 (2008), which 
“recogniz[ed] that the phrase, ‘by reason of,’ requires at least a showing of ‘but for’ 
causation”); id. at 176–77 (“‘An act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the 
particular event would have occurred without it.’” (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS,
ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 
1984)); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 281–82 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“By any normal understanding, the phrase ‘because of’ conveys the idea that the 
motive in question made a difference to the outcome. We use the words this way in everyday 
speech. . . . Any standard less than but-for . . . simply represents a decision to impose liability 
without causation.”); id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating the same with respect to 
“result from,” “based on,” and “made on the basis of”).
42. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009). Justices Stevens and 
Breyer wrote separate dissents. Justice Stevens deemed Thomas’s dictionary definitions a non 
sequitur: the fact that “dictionaries define ‘because of’ as ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of[,]’ 
[c]ontrary to the majority’s bald assertion . . . does not establish that the term denotes but-for 
causation.” Id. at 183 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 183 n.4 (“The dictionaries 
the Court cites do not, for instance, define ‘because of’ as ‘solely by reason of’ or ‘exclusively
on account of.’” (emphasis in original)); id. at 191 (“[T]he fact that a jury has found that age 
did play a role in the decision justifies the use of the word ‘because.’”). And Justice Breyer
likewise contended that, as a matter of ordinary language, “[t]he words ‘because of’ do not 
inherently require a showing of ‘but-for’ causation.” Id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. 570 U.S. 338, 349 (2013).
44. Id. at 350, 362 (emphasis in original) (citing Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–77).
45. Id. at 350 (“Concentrating first and foremost on the meaning of the phrase ‘“because 
of . . . age,”’ the Court in Gross explained that the ordinary meaning of ‘“because of”’ is ‘“by
reason of”’ or ‘“on account of.”’”); id. (noting that in Gross, “the ‘requirement that an 
employer took adverse action “because of” age [meant] that age was the “reason” that the 
employer decided to act,’ or, in other words, that ‘age was the “but-for” cause of the 
employer’s adverse decision.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 176)).
46. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 & n. 14 (2007) (noting 
that “because of” means “based on” and that “‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal 
relationship”); Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–66, (1992) (equating “by 
reason of” with “‘but for’ cause”)).
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causation as a matter of ordinary usage, and that plaintiffs must therefore allege and 
prove but-for causation.47
2. Criminal Law
Moving now from statutory torts to criminal law,48 these same ordinary causal 
language issues recently resurfaced in Burrage v. United States, involving 
interpretation of the CSA.49 The defendant, Burrage, had sold heroin to Josh Banka, 
who died of “mixed drug intoxication” shortly after injecting it.50 The statute subjects 
heroin sellers to enhanced sentences “if death or serious bodily injury results from
the use of such substance.”51 Because Banka had taken multiple drugs, experts were 
unable to testify that Banka would not have died “but for” his use of the heroin 
Burrage supplied.52 Burrage was convicted under the enhanced sentencing provision 
nonetheless.53
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the enhanced sentence applies only 
where the substance the defendant provided was a but-for cause of death.54 Since the 
statute “does not define the phrase ‘results from,’” the Court explained, “we give it 
its ordinary meaning,”55 and in “common talk,” phrases like “results from,” “because 
of,” and “by reason of . . . indicate[] a but-for causal relationship.”56 This but-for 
requirement, the Court explained, “is part of the common understanding of cause,”57
                                                                                                                
47. See, e.g., Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 
2016) (analyzing the language of the ADA); United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 143–
44 (3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing the language of the FHA); Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (analyzing the language of the ADA); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 
F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Craft, 484 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir.
2007) (analyzing the language of the FHA) (citing United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 
1310 (10th Cir. 2001) (same)); United States v. Johns, 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1980) (same);
United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1979) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 241, which 
criminalizes conspiracies targeting individuals “because of [their] having exercised” certain 
civil rights); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the 
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 677–79 (1991) 
(discussing textualism in civil rights cases).
48. Courts and commentators traditionally treat factual causation identically in the 
criminal and torts (including statutory torts) context, frequently drawing from both areas in 
the same decision. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 214 (2014); People v. 
Jennings, 237 P.3d 474, 496 n.13 (Cal. 2010) (“It is well established that the principles of 
causation, as they apply to tort law, are equally applicable to criminal law.”) (citing cases); 
State v. Burton, 370 S.W.3d 926, 931 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Christman, 249 P.3d 
680, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); MOORE, supra note 23.
49. 571 U.S. at 204.
50. Id. at 207.
51. Id. at 206 (emphasis added); see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2012).
52. 571 U.S. at 207.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id. at 210.
56. Id. at 213.
57. Id. at 211.
970 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 94:957
as revealed by examples from ordinary usage—e.g., what “is natural to say” and what 
“makes little sense to say” about the “cause” of a baseball team having won a game.58
The Court additionally cited a dictionary definition of “results,”59 discussed its own 
prior cases from various substantive contexts concerning the ordinary meaning of 
other causal language,60 and explained that the government’s “policy discussions are
beside the point. The role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written.”61
An important post-Burrage case brings us back, as in Gross and Nassar, to 
motives as causes, this time in the context of the federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act 
(HCPA).62 In United States v. Miller, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the 
HCPA, which, inter alia, provides enhanced sentences for attacking someone 
“because of” that person’s religion, requires a showing of but-for causation.63 The 
Sixth Circuit held that it does, on grounds of plain, ordinary meaning, and therefore 
reversed the conviction.64 Judge Sutton, writing for the majority, provided his own 
ordinary meaning analysis: “In everyday usage, the phrase ‘because of’ indicates a 
but-for causal link between the action that comes before it and the circumstance that 
comes afterwards. John carried an umbrella because of the rain. Jane stayed home 
from school because of her fever.”65 He quoted dictionary definitions for support: 
“Dictionary definitions of the phrase reflect this common-sense understanding: 
‘Because of’ means ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of.’”66 And he cited the Supreme 
Court’s and other courts’ recent ordinary meaning cases construing similar phrases,67
before concluding once again that “‘because of’ in brief means what it says: The 
                                                                                                                
58. Id. at 212.
59. Id. at 210 (“A thing ‘results’ when it ‘[a]rise[s] as an effect, issue, or outcome from 
some action, process or design.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting 2 THE NEW SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2570 (1993))). The Court therefore used the phrases “caused 
by” and “resulting from” interchangeably in the opinion. E.g., id. (“death caused by (‘resulting 
from’) the use of that drug”).
60. Id. at 212−13.
61. Id. at 218. In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice 
Sotomayor) reiterated that she “do[es] not read ‘because of’ in the context of 
antidiscrimination laws to mean ‘solely because of.’” Id. at 219. Nonetheless, because “there 
is room for debate” in interpreting the words “results from,” Ginsburg applied the rule of lenity 
and joined the majority’s judgment. Id.
62. See 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012 & Supp. 2018).
63. 767 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014).
64. Id. at 589. Defendants had argued that, at most, religion-based animosity was one 
among several motivations for their assaults. Id. at 590−91. But they had been convicted under 
a jury instruction that stated that the statute’s causation requirement could be met if the 
victims’ faith was a “significant motivating factor” in the assaults. Id. at 591. At least prior to 
Burrage, a similar standard and jury instruction—“substantial factor” or “substantial 
motivating factor”—was the most common instruction for federal statutes with a motive 
element. See Leonard B. SAND, JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN, STEVEN A. REISS,
STEVE ALLEN, JED S. RAKOFF & DAVID M. EPSTEIN, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
chs. 17.02, 17.06, 17.15, 17.29 (2018) (collecting cases).
65. Miller, 767 F.3d at 591.
66. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 242 (1950); 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2012)).
67. See id. 592−93.
2019] ORDINARY CAUSATION 971
prohibited act or motive must be an actual cause of the specified outcome” (by which 
he meant a “but-for” cause).68
Again, Burrage and Miller, like Gross and Nassar, are only the tip of the iceberg. 
Other courts, interpreting federal and state statutes, jury instructions, and even judge-
made common law standards, continue to expand the reach of the Court’s reasoning 
concerning the commonsense meaning of these causal phrases.69
B. Potential Problems and Roads Not Taken
A quick skim of courts’ intuition-pumping examples (“John carried an umbrella 
because of the rain,” etc.70) might convince one that these courts have it right; 
perhaps, one might think, terms like “because of” and “results from” really do entail 
but-for causation as a matter of ordinary usage. But there may be problems with these 
courts’ but-for entailment thesis. There may be cases where we know that x is not a 
but-for cause of y, yet at least some of us feel the urge to say that y happened “because 
of” x, that y “resulted from” x, and so forth. Even if you don’t share the urge, it is 
worth understanding where at least some courts and commentators feel it. Here, we’ll 
look at two categories of such cases (specifically, for those familiar with the jargon, 
two common kinds of “overdetermination” cases).71 Then we’ll examine a few 
alternative causation tests (the “contributing factor,” “substantial factor,” and “sole 
                                                                                                                
68. Id. at 591−92 (emphasis in original); accord, e.g., United States v. Doggart, No. 1:15-
cr-39, 2016 WL 6205804, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 24, 2016); United States v. Metcalf, No. 15-
CR-1032-LRR, 2016 WL 1599485, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 20, 2016).
69. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 5–9, 47. Time will tell what additional statutes and 
doctrines courts will import these ordinary language holdings into next. Here, for example, are 
five relatively prominent possibilities: (1) criminal defense of provocation, see, e.g., United 
States v. Begay, 673 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The defendant must produce evidence 
‘that the defendant was acting out of passion rather than malice’ before the burden shifts to 
the government to ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of sudden quarrel or heat of
passion.’” (emphasis added)); (2) criminal defense of self-defense, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 394 (5th ed. 2012); (3) whistleblower retaliation claims, see Nancy M. 
Modesitt, Causation in Whistleblowing Claims, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193 (2016); (4) securities 
fraud and other fraud claims, see Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal 
Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 813 (2009); David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 
KY. L.J. 277, 297−98 (2005); (5) civil rights claims against individuals and municipalities 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012 & Supp. 2018), see Barbara Kritchevsky, “Or Causes to Be
Subjected”: The Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Analysis, 35 UCLA L. 
REV. 1187 (1988); Sheldon Nahmod, Mt. Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still 
Doesn’t Get It!, 51 MERCER L. REV. 603 (2000); Hillel Levin & Michael Wells, Qualified 
Immunity and Statutory Interpretation: A Response to William Baude, CAL. L. REV. ONLINE
(forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting that, 
while the Supreme Court rarely turns to the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to resolve cases brought 
pursuant to it, one exception is where the statute’s “subject, or cause to be subjected” phrase 
is at issue, as in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691−92
(1978)).
70. E.g., Miller, 767 F.3d at 591; see also Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 215 
(2014); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
71. Cf. Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, 
Legal and Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 474 (2016).
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cause” tests) that some courts and commentators claim more closely track 
commonsense causal intuitions, in these and other cases, than does the but-for test. 
1. Unnecessary “Causes”?
Here is one situation where but-for causation may not capture our ordinary notions 
of causation: the focal event or motive is unnecessary to the outcome in question (so 
it is not a but-for cause) but it would also have been fully sufficient, all by itself, to 
bring about the outcome in question, i.e., absent whatever other (non-focal) events 
or motives happened to play a role. For example, imagine two shooters, Al and Ben:
each simultaneously shoots the same victim in the head; the victim would have died 
from either shot by itself; the prosecutor charges Al with murder. But did Al cause 
the victim’s death? That hypothetical may seem far-fetched, but there are numerous 
real-life examples of multiple perpetrators generating a legally cognizable harm 
where their individual actions were unnecessary and independently sufficient to 
bring about the harm (and, in motive-as-cause cases, there are likewise numerous 
real-life examples where an actor has multiple motivations for his or her action and 
each motivation is unnecessary and independently sufficient to act).72 Indeed, all the 
cases above are easily turned into examples.73 And while there are examples from 
drug overdose,74 discrimination,75 and hate crime76 cases like the ones described 
                                                                                                                
72. See id. (“Contrary to what proponents of the [but-for] criterion as the exclusive 
criterion [for causation] often assume, instances of overdetermined causation are not rare.”)
(discussing examples); see also Eric A. Johnson, Wrongful-Aspect Overdetermination: The 
Scope-of-the-Risk Requirement in Drunk-Driving Homicide, 46 CONN. L. REV. 601, 644 
(2013). Some common examples that have recently received attention involve acquittals of 
multiple police officers for their simultaneous use of force on a single victim. See, e.g., Ben 
Gifford, State v. Brelo and the Problem of Actual Causation, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L. 157, 157
(2017) (discussing case in which “the judge relied explicitly on the theory that the lethality of 
the gunshot wounds inflicted by each officer rendered every other officer’s gunshot wounds 
unnecessary to the victims’ deaths”); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The 
Relation Between Counterfactual (“But For”) and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings 
and Implications for Jurors’ Decisions, 64 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 256−57 (2001) 
(discussing acquittal of four police officers who shot single victim forty-one times).
Prosecutors sometimes avoid these causation problems by charging one of the relevant actors 
as a direct cause and charging the others as accomplices or co-conspirators. Although that 
charging decision is often available where multiple actors concurrently cause harm, it is not 
available in motive-as-cause cases (i.e., cases concerning the causal role of a single actor’s 
multiple motivations).
73. Cf. infra Part IV.
74. E.g., United States v. Smith, No. 6:13–43–KKC, 2015 WL 4458891 (E.D. Ky. July 
21, 2015).
75. E.g., Hendon v. Kamtek, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1332 (N.D. Ala. 2015); cf.
Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination 
in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001).
76. See, e.g., State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 833–35 (Iowa 2010) (construing state 
hate crime statute in case where driver was prosecuted for allegedly running over African 
American person both “because” she was in the street and “because” she was African 
American).
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above, there are also others throughout criminal and tort law.77 Courts treat these 
cases inconsistently.78 Some hold fast, maintaining the requirement of but-for 
causation and finding no liability.79 Others find causation requirements satisfied, 
often invoking “a kind of legal fiction or construct” or a “policy based departure” 
from what they consider to be the plain, commonsense meaning of the relevant causal 
language.80
A second possible problem area for the but-for test involves factors that were 
neither necessary nor independently sufficient for bringing about the result in 
question, yet still played some role—contributed in some way—to its coming about. 
Consider Banka’s death in the Burrage case: if the heroin was unnecessary (the other 
drugs would have killed Banka by themselves), and independently insufficient
(absent the other drugs, Banka would have lived), would we say that the use of the 
heroin caused Banka’s death? The Article will return to this and other examples in 
Part IV, but for now, the important point is that these sorts of scenarios are also 
pervasive in criminal and tort law, and courts once again lack a unified approach. 
Sometimes courts find insufficient and unnecessary contributors like these to be 
                                                                                                                
77. See Gerald W. Boston, Apportionment of Harm in Tort Law: A Proposed Restatement,
21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 267 (1996) (providing examples).
78. See MOORE, supra note 23, at 115, 427−38 (discussing cases in criminal law and torts 
and noting different approaches both within and between U.K. and U.S. law).
79. See, e.g., Hendon, 117 F. Supp. 3d at 1332 (reasoning that employment discrimination 
plaintiff, by alleging multiple independently sufficient motivations on the part of defendant, 
defeated her own causation claims); Donald v. UAB Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 
2:14−cv−727−WMA, 2015 WL 3952307, at *2–3 (N.D. Ala. June 29, 2015) (same); Gifford, 
supra note 72; Spellman & Kincannon, supra note 72; see also Burrage v. United States, 571 
U.S. 204, 215 (2014) (noting that the Model Penal Code (MPC) requires necessary (not merely 
sufficient) cause, while some state courts instead use “substantial” or “contributing” factor 
rules, and noting the debate that occurred during the MPC’s drafting over whether to instead 
adopt the “substantial factor” test); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Official Draft 1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt., 2 at 259 (AM. LAW INST.
1985) (explaining the MPC’s attempted preservation of liability in overdetermination 
scenarios via a but-for test that asks whether the forbidden result would have arisen “when 
and as it did” absent the factor in question); AM. LAW INST., 39TH ANNUAL MEETING 
PROCEEDINGS 135–41 (1962); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 187–88
(2018) (arguing in favor of this approach); PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE 
UTILITY OF DESERT 392 (2013) (MPC drafters “apparently thought they had to preserve the 
necessary cause test because the necessary cause test was so well entrenched in the popular 
psyche”); Eric A. Johnson, Cause-in-Fact After Burrage v. United States, 68 FLA. L. REV.
1727, 1736 (2016) (noting that the MPC’s “when and as it did” approach “never really caught 
on with judges”).
80. Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014); see also id. at 458 (citing
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 212); Wright & Puppe, supra note 71, at 474 (citing cases and 
commentaries). In Burrage, the majority explicitly declined to address whether some such 
departure from plain meaning would be warranted in the event that the defendant sold a drug 
that was unnecessary but independently sufficient to bring about the user’s death. Burrage,
571 U.S. at 215 (“We need not accept or reject the special rule developed for these cases, since 
there was no evidence here that Banka’s heroin use was an independently sufficient cause of 
his death.”).
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causal, other times not.81 Both courts and commentators are likewise divided over 
whether and when treating insufficient and unnecessary contributions as causes 
tracks folk notions of causation and ordinary usage of causal terms.82
2. Alternative Causation Tests
Some courts and commentators favor alternative factual causation tests in place 
of the but-for test. Some do so only in circumstances like those described directly 
above; others do so more generally, regardless of whether those circumstances are 
present or considered problematic. Courts’ alternative tests can be divided into the 
following three: (1) “contributing factor” tests; (2) “substantial factor” tests; and (3) 
“sole” cause tests.83 (The Article will come back to these tests in Part IV below; for 
now, the main point is simply to see what they are, and to get a sense of courts’ and 
commentators’ widespread disagreement about them.) 
The first alternative to a “but-for” standard (and the one that is most inclusive in 
what it deems a “cause”) was explicitly rejected in Burrage and many of the other 
decisions described above: the “contributing factor” test.84 It would label as causes 
both types of contributors considered above (i.e., all contributing factors regardless 
of whether they are independently sufficient to bring about the harm). It would, in 
                                                                                                                
81. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 215; Fischer, supra note 69, at 277−79, 284−87; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27(i) & cmt. f (Am. Law. Inst. 2005) (“[D]ecided cases 
[concerning unnecessary and insufficient contributors] do not support clear rules.”); MOORE,
supra note 23, at 115; Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 131−32 (1985); 
David J. Karp, Causation in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1761 (1978); 
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1974, 1980 (1985); 
Richard W. Wright, Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1443−45 (2003); cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 cmt. f, illus. 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2005); Eric A. Johnson, 
Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 91 IOWA L. REV. 59, 67−68 (2005).
82. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27(i) cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2005)
(“Intuition might suggest that the [unnecessary and insufficient contributor] is not a cause,” 
but “significantly, [the intuition] may not be widely shared. . . . Several scholars have tried to 
provide algorithms to explain these cases. Unfortunately, they do not always agree on the 
appropriate outcomes.”); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Alaska, Colorado, Hawai’i, Kansas, 
New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming in Support of Respondent, 
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (No. 12-7515), 2013 WL 5616723, at *18 n.5 
(arguing that “[t]here is no reason to suppose . . . that the sufficient-by-itself stipulation bears 
on” whether conduct “seems intuitively to qualify as a cause” (citing LAFAVE, supra note 69,
at 468)); MOORE, supra note 23, at 86 (claiming that non-liability in cases of unnecessary and 
insufficient contributors is “contrary to common intuition as well as some legal authority”
(citing People v. Lewis, 57 P. 470 (Cal. 1899))); Fischer, supra note 69, at 282−83, 289 
(surveying Hart and Honoré’s, Richard Wright’s, and the author’s own differing intuitions 
concerning whether unnecessary and insufficient contributors constitute causes); David 
Hamer, “Factual Causation” and “Scope of Liability”: What’s the Difference?, 77 MODERN 
L. REV. 155, 172 (2014) (describing differing intuitions in cases of unnecessary and/or 
insufficient contribution).
83. Cf. Wright & Puppe, supra note 71, at 480 (citing cases and commentary).
84. E.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 216; Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176
(2009); United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 592 (6th Cir. 2014).
2019] ORDINARY CAUSATION 975
short, label every contributor a cause, no matter how small its contribution. This 
strikes some courts and commentators as simply too permissive to cohere with 
ordinary usage and intuitions regarding causation.85 Others, however, claim that it 
does reflect common intuition.86 Courts attracted to this approach but leery of its 
alleged overpermissiveness sometimes add qualifiers like “significant contributing 
factor.”87 That impulse brings us to the less permissive, but also less clear, 
“substantial factor” test.
The second test some courts apply—the “substantial factor” test—was also 
explicitly rejected in Burrage and many of the other decisions discussed above.88
Whereas the “contributing factor” test tells jurors, without further elaboration, that 
they are to consider whether x was a “contributing factor” in bringing about y, the 
substantial factor test, similarly without elaboration, simply instructs jurors to 
consider whether x was a “substantial factor” in bringing about y. As one can 
imagine, much turns on how people interpret the term “substantial.”89 Courts and 
commentators have increasingly criticized the test for its seeming lack of clarity or 
predictability.90 As the Burrage Court indicated, courts differ widely in their 
understanding of (a) what the test actually requires jurors to find, and (b) when, if 
ever, it more closely tracks ordinary causal intuitions than does the but-for test.91
As for what the test requires jurors to find, all agree that it entails more than mere 
contribution.92 But what else it requires is not clear.93 Most agree that it requires a 
                                                                                                                
85. E.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 217; sources cited supra note 82.
86. See, e.g., Holsemback v. State, 443 So. 2d 1371, 1382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Cox 
v. State, 808 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Ark. 1991); People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474, 496 (Cal. 2010); 
People v. Lewis, 57 P. 470, 473 (Cal. 1899); Commonwealth v. Osachuk, 681 N.E.2d 292, 
294 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); People v. Bailey, 549 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Mich. 1996); State v. 
Christman, 249 P.3d 680, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N.
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 771 (3d ed. 1982).
87. See Miller, 767 F.3d at 592 (citing Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218) (faulting such language 
for its lack of precision); see also Burrage, 571 U.S. at 217 (citing Wilson v. State, 24 S.W. 
409, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893) (“contributed materially”) (emphasis added)).
88. See, e.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 216.
89. See David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 
1347.
90. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 217; see also Miller, 767 F.3d at 592. After the First and 
Second Restatements of Torts’ use of the test, the Restatement (Third) of Torts recently 
jettisoned it largely on the ground that it was too vague and promoted confusion. See AARON 
D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 232 (2d ed. 2008) 
(“The [Third] Restatement has wisely rid itself of the substantial factor test. . . . [T]he 
substantial factor test caused confusion. . . . Few will mourn the passing of the ‘substantial 
factor’ test.”); David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1765, 1779−80 (1997); Joseph Sanders, Michael D. Green & William C. Powers, Jr., The 
Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 399, 418 
(2008).
91. The oral argument in Burrage provides a particularly vivid demonstration of the 
confusion the test can generate among judges and litigants alike. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 13−14, 38−41, Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2013) (No. 12−7515).
92. See, e.g., Abney v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. 2002).
93. E.g., Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 346, 351, 373–74 (Tex. 2014).
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given contribution to be more than merely de minimus in amount.94 Most also agree 
that it does not require but-for causation, though Joshua Dressler, along with several 
courts, disagree, based on intuitions about the term “substantial” and “the way we 
talk about causation.”95
As for when, if ever, the “substantial factor” test should apply, some courts apply 
the test across the board, as an allegedly more accurate definition of causation for all 
cases,96 including where but-for causation appears to be satisfied.97 Other courts 
apply it only where the evidence is sufficient to prove either (a) that but-for causation 
is met, or (b) that the alleged “cause” in question was independently sufficient, even 
if unnecessary.98 Yet other courts use the instruction only for non-necessary, 
independently insufficient contributing factors.99 And many courts and 
commentators are not clear about when or why they apply the test.100
                                                                                                                
94. Sanders et al., supra note 90, at 418; MOORE, supra note 23, at 120 (“Clearly a 
quantitative measure is intended here.”). In this way, it is sometimes more restrictive than the 
but-for test, which allows for tiny contributions to count as causes so long as the event in 
question would not have occurred without them. See People v. Caldwell, 681 P.2d 274, 280 
(Cal. 1984); People v. Wells, 355 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Mich. 1984) (Levin, J., dissenting).
95. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 187 (6th ed. 2012) (“[I]t is hard 
to comprehend how a person’s conduct can ever be a ‘substantial factor’ in causing a result 
that was going to occur when it did even without his contribution. The only way it may be 
sensibly be said that a concurrent sufficient cause . . . is a substantial factor in an outcome is 
to point out that the force would have been the cause of the harm if circumstances had been 
different (i.e., if the other sufficient cause . . . had not materialized). However this is not the 
way we ordinarily talk about causation.” (emphasis in original)); accord State v. Montoya, 61 
F.3d 793, 799 (N.M. 2002) (quoting Dressler’s text); see also United States v. Jenkins, 120 F.
Supp. 3d 650, 658 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (construing the HCPA and concluding that “because of” 
entails necessity—i.e., but-for causation—as a matter of ordinary language, and that the phrase 
“the substantial factor” captures this necessity requirement, since necessity is “a status 
reserved only for the most substantial of the motivating factors”).
96. E.g., People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474, 496 (2010). But see Lawrence M. Solan & 
John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution and Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 271 (2001) (“[I]t is not the least bit obvious that substantial factor 
defines causation other than stipulatively.”).
97. E.g., Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 742 P.2d 377, 386−90 (Haw. 1987); 
Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Wis. 1984). This is to the 
chagrin of numerous commentators. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 90, at 1779−80 (“When 
courts begin turning to the substantial factor vocabulary in a broader range of cases, valuable 
precision of analysis is lost and nothing is gained.”); Sanders et al., supra note 90, at 417−18.
98. E.g., Jennings, 237 P.3d at 496.
99. E.g., Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 N.E.2d 1384 (Ind. 1995); Roberson v. Counselman, 
686 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1984); Hake v. Manchester Twp., 486 A.2d 836 (N.J. 1985); State v. 
Christman, 249 P.3d 680, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). And some courts apply it only where it 
is clear that but-for causation is absent, yet there are multiple independently sufficient non-
necessary causes. E.g., In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 497 F.3d 1005, 1028−29 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“[S]ubstantial factor causation . . . applies when there have been ‘multiple, 
independent causes,’ each of which alone is sufficient to cause the injury.” (quoting Gausvik 
v. Abbey, 107 P.3d 98, 108 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005))).
100. See, e.g., State v. Wassil, 658 A.2d 548, 551 (Conn. 1995); State v. William, 435 
N.W.2d 174, 177 (Neb. 1989); State v. Lillie, 193 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Or. Ct. App. 2008);
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A third and final test, while less prevalent, is worth mention in large part because 
of how frequently it gets mistaken for the others: the “sole” cause test. Justice 
Ginsburg, for example, in multiple opinions, registers disagreement with the notion 
that “because of” means “solely because of”101 and the notion that an event can only 
“result from” one cause,102 seemingly considering these points responsive to the 
Court’s adoption of the “but-for” test.103 Yet but-for causes need not be, and rarely 
are, sole causes.104 Justice Stevens likewise attacked the “sole” cause test in his Gross 
dissent, despite nobody advocating for it.105 And other judges have at times echoed 
these same points.106 In short, while criminal and tort law do occasionally use “sole” 
cause rules,107 they are uncommon and not generally thought to reflect common 
usage or causal intuitions.
II. WHEN AND WHY COURTS CARE ABOUT ORDINARY
USAGE AND FOLK CONCEPTS
As seen in the cases discussed above, courts often fixate on the ordinary meaning 
and folk concept of causation, evaluating competing interpretations and doctrinal 
tests according to how closely they map onto the ordinary meaning of the statute’s 
causal language. This Part takes up a more fundamental question: Should courts care 
about the ordinary understanding and folk concept of causation? It answers in the 
affirmative,108 for reasons that have to do with (a) statutory interpretation generally, 
                                                                                                                
KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, § 41, at 266, 268; LAFAVE, supra note 69, § 6.4, at 468, 479.
101. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 219 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Univ. 
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 369 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
102. See id.
103. Id. Occasionally courts do endorse a but-for test while also mistakenly drawing 
inferences that assume it is the same as a sole cause test. E.g., United States v. Hill, 182 F. 
Supp. 3d 546, 555 n.8 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“[I]f the conduct underlying an HCPA prosecution 
has any sort of commercial motivation—if, for example, Hill had punched C.T. because of 
both C.T.’s sexual orientation and C.T. having taken Hill’s job as a packer—then the 
government could never obtain a conviction, as the HCPA requires ‘but-for’ causation.”
(citing United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 594 (6th Cir. 2014))). And some judges have 
even relied on Ginsburg’s seeming equation of but-for and sole cause tests in order to deny 
relief to discrimination plaintiffs on the ground that, in pleading multiple unlawful 
motivations, the plaintiff had necessarily failed to allege but-for causation (since, on this 
mistaken reading, there can only be one but-for cause). See, e.g., Hendon v. Kamtek, Inc., 117 
F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1332 (N.D. Ala. 2015); Donald v. UAB Hosp. Mgmt., No. 
2:14−cv−727−WMA, 2015 WL 3952307, at *2−3 (N.D. Ala. June 29, 2015).
104. See, e.g., Husted v. A. Philip Randolf Inst., No. 16−980, slip op. at 10−11 (U.S. June 
11, 2018). 
105. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 183 n.4 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. E.g., State v. Malone, 819 P.2d 34, 36 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); State v. Christman,
249 P.3d 680, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); cases cited supra note 103.
107. See MOORE, supra note 23, at 114; Verstein, supra note 30.
108. To reiterate: this Article does not claim that judges ought to resolve statutory disputes, 
even in the criminal and tort causation context, exclusively via determinations of ordinary 
meaning (as they presently purport to do). See supra note 16; infra Section IV.C.
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(b) criminal and tort law specifically, and (c) the role of causation requirements in 
criminal and tort law.
A. Statutory Interpretation Generally
As the cases above and countless others make clear, judges “throughout the 
political spectrum”109 purport to care a great deal about ordinary usage in statutory 
interpretation.110 They treat it as the default starting point for interpretation,111 and 
where it clearly favors a given interpretation, many treat it as the sole determinant of 
statutory meaning.112 Virtually all judges and commentators—including those who 
disfavor treating ordinary meaning as dispositive—agree that it is a necessary 
consideration in statutory interpretation.113 And in the near term at least, judicial 
interest in ordinary meaning appears likely to increase.114 But is ordinary meaning 
merely a necessary evil? Or are there reasons to want judges to consider it?
                                                                                                                
109. Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Finding Ordinary Meaning in Law: The Judge, 
the Dictionary or the Corpus?, 1 INT’L J.L. DISCOURSE 253, 254 (2016) (collecting examples).
110. Id.; VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R45153, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 21 (2018) (quoting examples demonstrating 
that “all current members of the Supreme Court have regularly invoked this rule of ordinary 
meaning”); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118 (2016); accord WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ 
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON,
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 60 (2d ed. 2013); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); SLOCUM, supra note 10;
LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION (2010); 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899) 
(legal texts are to be interpreted by the standard of the “normal speaker of English”); Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and 
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 251 (2010).
111. Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: 
The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying 
to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 191 (2017); Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2118; Solan & 
Gales, supra note 109, at 254.
112. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014); Baude & Doerfler, 
supra note 10 (collecting cases); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 
1750, 1756−58 (2010) (concluding that state courts, like federal courts, give primacy to text 
and decline to look to external sources of meaning if they deem the text “plain”).
113. See Fallon, supra note 10, at 1252−53 (“In seeking to understand legal meaning, 
attention to the norms that govern ascriptions of meaning in ordinary conversation is almost 
self-evidently appropriate.”); SLOCUM, supra note 10, at 8−9 (“[T]he ordinary meaning 
doctrine is influential because it is difficult to conceive of a realistic methodology of 
interpretation in which it would not be influential,” hence “[e]ven critics who question the 
decisiveness of ordinary meaning concede the doctrine’s influence.”) (citing examples). But 
see Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501 (2015).
114. See Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2144−45, 2150 (advocating that judges “determine 
the best reading of the statute, not whether it is clear or ambiguous,” and explaining that under 
this “best reading” approach, “[c]ourts should try to read statutes as ordinary users of the 
English language might read and understand them”).
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One such reason suggested by the recent “positive turn” in legal interpretation 
scholarship—and familiar to any practicing lawyer—is simply that the case law itself 
says to consider ordinary meaning.115 On this view, courts ought to care about 
ordinary meaning because binding authoritative texts direct courts to consider it (and 
indeed, to treat it as dispositive in the event it is clear or obvious).116
A second and more substantive reason for giving weight to ordinary meaning, 
often highlighted by courts and commentators, is that it frequently constitutes the 
most reliable indication of Congress’s understanding, intent, and purpose in passing 
the statutory provision whose meaning is in question. As an empirical matter, this 
rationale is plausible as applied to the understanding or intent of individual drafters 
of legislation: congressional drafters are more aware of the ordinary and plain 
meaning doctrines than any other interpretive canon, and while drafting legislation 
they rarely consult sources other than their own intuitive understanding of the words 
used.117 But perhaps more importantly, even where individual congresspersons or 
legislative drafters possess their own idiosyncratic and non-ordinary understandings, 
ordinary meaning might nonetheless remain the only plausible candidate meaning 
understood by Congress as a whole, i.e., as a collective body capable of possessing 
an intent, a purpose, or an understanding of what a word or phrase means.118 Of
course, there are exceptions—instances where Congress clearly did not intend what 
the ordinary meaning of the statute’s words conveys (scrivener’s errors are the 
clearest example).119 But by and large, as the Court emphasized in Gross, courts 
purport to interpret statutes in accordance with “the language employed by Congress 
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses 
the legislative purpose.”120
                                                                                                                
115. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 10, at 1134.
116. Id.; see also supra note 10 (discussing plain meaning rule).
117. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside
—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 995 (2013).
118. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach, Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988). This aspect of ordinary meaning—its being the 
meaning on which the largest number of people’s interpretations are likely to converge—is 
central to other prominent arguments in favor of ordinary meaning interpretation, beyond those 
concerning congressional purpose or intent. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Statutory 
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232 
(advocating the plain meaning rule as a “second-best coordinating device”); David A. Strauss, 
Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1566 (1997) (arguing that an ordinary 
meaning default reduces otherwise costly disagreement).
119. See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 811 (2016); John 
F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2459 n.265 (2005).
120. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n
v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004)); see also Burrage v. United 
States, 571 U.S. 204, 216 (2014); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 375−76 (2013); 
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 79 (2007) (stating that statutory meaning often “has to 
turn on the language as we normally speak it”—on “everyday meaning”—because “[w]ith no 
statutory definition or definitive clue, . . . there is no other source of a reasonable inference 
about what Congress understood when writing” the statute (emphasis added)); Green, 490 
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Finally, proponents of ordinary meaning interpretation, and of textualism more 
broadly, claim that it constrains judges,121 thereby promoting rule of law values122
such as adjudicative consistency, predictability, and neutrality.123 These and other 
related rule of law concerns receive their greatest emphasis in the context of criminal 
statutes, to which we’ll now turn.
B. Criminal and Tort Law Generally
Unlike many areas of law, criminal liability (along with some kinds of tort 
liability) expresses moral condemnation, often via extraordinary means like punitive 
fines or prison.124 Here the Article considers three closely related outgrowths of these 
blaming and punitive treatment aspects of criminal and tort law, each of which makes 
ordinary meaning analysis especially appealing to courts and commentators: (1) the 
need for restraints on the government, (2) the need to provide fair notice to those 
subject to the law, and (3) the use of juries.
First, ordinary meaning analysis restrains the government’s ability to use its 
punitive power improperly, including in lawmaking,125 enforcement,126 and 
adjudication.127 As for lawmaking, ordinary meaning facilitates accountability for 
lawmakers by allowing citizens to understand the content of laws at the time they are 
passed.128 With respect to enforcement, ordinary meaning diminishes enforcement 
authorities’ (e.g., police officers’) ability to claim mistake of law based on 
nonordinary interpretations, and it makes genuine mistakes of law less likely in the 
                                                                                                                
U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121. All agree that text and ordinary meaning provide some constraint; the disagreement 
among judges and scholars concerns how much. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 10, 113, 
infra note 301.
122. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 364 (1990).
123. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 110, at 39−40; Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory 
of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 291 (1985).
124. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965); 
Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort Law, 10 J.
TORT L. 1 (2017).
125. See Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 335, 348−53 (2005) (discussing the Constitution’s prohibitions of certain ex 
post facto laws). 
126. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (discussing prohibition on 
vindictive prosecution). 
127. See Robinson, supra note 125, at 353−56.
128. See Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 588 (2015); 
Nourse, supra note 10, at 1004. The point is not only about the importance of timing for 
purposes of holding lawmakers accountable but also about the importance of concentrating, 
rather than diffusing, perceived responsibility for the law’s content. Insofar as ordinary 
meaning interpretation is perceived to constrain judges, it may help concentrate perceived 
responsibility for statutory law’s content on the legislature itself, rather than allowing the 
legislature to diffuse that responsibility by blaming the content of an unpopular law on judges’ 
subsequent interpretive decisions.
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first place.129 Finally, as to adjudication, ordinary meaning prevents judges from 
giving statutes less lenient interpretations than those most readily apparent to 
ordinary speakers.130
A second rule of law concern paramount in criminal law and at least some areas 
of tort law is fair notice—a value that more directly implicates ordinary meaning 
analysis (as do the various doctrines associated with notice concerns, including void-
for-vagueness,131 the prohibition on punitive ex post facto laws,132 and the doctrine 
of lenity133). As courts often emphasize, ordinary citizens must have a fair 
opportunity to ascertain what the law permits, what it prohibits, and what legal 
consequences can follow from violating it.134 This means articulating law in language 
understandable to normal English speakers whose conduct is subject to it.135
                                                                                                                
129. See Richard H. McAdams, Close Enough for Government Work? Heien’s Less-Than-
Reasonable Mistake of the Rule of Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 147. Relatedly, heavy reliance on 
pro se representation and overburdened public legal services in criminal and civil rights 
litigation likewise puts a thumb on the scale in favor of ordinary meaning as a check on the 
government’s ability to overpower defendants bringing meritorious claims. Cf. id. at 188–90 
(emphasizing the dangers implicit in allowing government to exploit ambiguities in laws it has 
passed).
130. See, e.g., Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218 (2014).
131. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited . . . .”); Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[W]e insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly.”).
132. Robinson, supra note 125, at 348−56.
133. E.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 219 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
134. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 131; Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); 
Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218; United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) 
(“[W]e are concerned with the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness 
may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct.” (citing Thornhill 
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940))); Robinson, supra note 125.
135. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 217−18; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; McBoyle v. United 
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“Although it is not likely that a criminal will 
carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair 
warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of 
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 345 (1983); Robinson, supra note 125, at 364. 
The standard for fair notice as applied to police officers in the context of qualified 
immunity requires far more by way of legal clarity than does the requisite fair notice as applied 
to ordinary citizens. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (“[T]he focus is on 
whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful,” which in turn requires that 
the “statutory or constitutional question [be] beyond debate” at the time the officer acted, so 
that “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” are protected 
from liability due to their having received insufficient notice of what the law required.); see 
also id. at 1158 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“At its core, then, the ‘clearly established’ inquiry 
boils down to whether [defendant officer] had ‘fair notice’ that he acted unconstitutionally.”);
David Louk, The Audiences of Statutes: Statutory Interpretation from the Outside,
104 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana 
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Third and finally, criminal and tort law’s extensive reliance on juries provides 
further reason for courts to consider ordinary usage. Juries construe instructions 
according to their ordinary meaning, and judges presume that they do so when 
reviewing and approving jury instructions.136 Moreover, judges at the trial and 
appellate level, through various procedural mechanisms, must determine what a 
reasonable jury could (or in post-trial circumstances, could have) conclude(d) based 
on the instructions it received, often compared with some variation of them that was 
proposed and rejected.137 In short, jury-related procedures necessitate frequent and 
consequential ordinary meaning determinations throughout tort and criminal law, 
whether judges like it or not. 
C. Causation in Criminal and Tort Law
Throughout statutory and common law criminal and torts case law, judges claim 
that the law’s concept of causation is the man on the street’s concept of causation.138
Many commentators, most famously philosophers of criminal and tort law, make the 
same claim, treating the concept of factual causation in law as a matter of “common 
sense.”139 “[I]t is the plain man’s notions of causation,” Hart and Honoré asserted in 
their seminal work, Causation In the Law, “with which the law is concerned.”140 But 
why should it be? Many of the reasons judges and philosophers provide echo the 
reasons considered above. Hart and Honoré, for example, appealed to rule of law 
values like those discussed above,141 and many of the other arguments discussed 
                                                                                                                
Law Journal).
136. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991).
137. This ordinary language interpretation and application task is especially fraught 
where—as happens frequently in criminal and tort law—the instructions concern mixed 
questions of law and fact, using open-ended and normativity-infused terms like “reasonable” 
or “reckless” (or perhaps “results from” or “because of”). See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. 
Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. L. REV. 1769 (2003); Suja A. Thomas, 
The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759 (2009).
138. Burrage, 571 U.S. at 215; People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474 (Cal. 2010); State v. 
Burton, 370 S.W.3d 926, 931 n.3 (Mont. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Christman, 249 P.3d 680, 
687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); Moore, supra note 23; Richard W. Wright, The Nightmare and 
the Noble Dream: Hart and Honoré on Causation and Responsibility, in THE LEGACY OF 
H.L.A. HART: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 11 (Matthew H. Kramer et al. eds., 
2008); Solan & Darley, supra note 96, at 272 (“[I]n making decisions about causation, courts 
at least purport to be applying ‘common sense’ intuitions, to use Hart & Honoré’s standard for 
how causative notions enter the law.”).
139. DRESSLER, supra note 95, at 160 (“The role of [factual] causality in the criminal law 
is the same as it is in the evaluation of any everyday event: to determine why something
occurred.”); KEETON ET AL., supra note 41, at 264 (“This question of ‘fact’ ordinarily is one 
upon which all the learning, literature and lore of the law are largely lost. It is a matter upon 
which lay opinion is quite as competent as that of the most experienced court.”); Robertson, 
supra note 90; Solan & Darley, supra note 96, at 271 n.30 (“Contemporary torts theorists also 
look at causation in fact as a common sense notion.”).
140. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 23, at 1.
141. See WILLIAM LUCY, PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE LAW 203 (2007); Jane Stapleton, 
Unpacking Causation, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ ON HIS 
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above likewise apply to criminal and statutory tort causation for the same reason they 
apply to other statutory terms in law generally and/or criminal and tort law 
specifically.142 But is there anything about the issue of causation in particular that 
gives additional weight to those earlier arguments for ordinary meaning, or that gives 
rise to new and distinct reasons to care about ordinary meaning? 
One prominent reason in the philosophy of criminal and tort law begins along the 
following lines, as articulated by Michael Moore: (1) “criminal and tort liability must
track moral responsibility,” (2) “moral responsibility depends in part on causal 
responsibility,” therefore (3) “‘cause’ in [at least criminal and tort] law must mean 
what it means in morality.”143 To be sure, there are those who would argue against 
each of Moore’s three claims. But for present purposes, the key question is how, if 
one agrees with (3), one might get to caring about ordinary meaning and folk 
concepts in the context of causation. And here’s that route: (4) ordinary moral 
intuitions, and the ordinary linguistic usage through which we communicate those 
intuitions in terms of causal responsibility, are important evidence of what “cause”
means, including in morality.144 In short, we care about how people ordinarily think 
and talk about causation because it is evidence of what causation is, which in turn 
bears on moral responsibility.
Now, as it happens, Moore himself might not put much stock in (4) (for reasons 
we’ll return to in Section V.C).145 But we needn’t get bogged down by that right now, 
because even assuming that lay usage and intuitions aren’t credible evidence of 
fundamental conceptual, moral, or metaphysical truths, there remain reasons why 
criminal and tort law ought nonetheless to track lay usage and intuitions about 
causation. Like Moore’s argument above, these arguments posit that causation is, at 
least in lay understanding, a morally important concept. But they are arguments for 
why, independent of the “true nature” of causation or morality as a matter of 
metaphysics,146 or the “true content” of causal terms’ referents as a matter of 
philosophical semantics,147 folk intuitions and usage have independent importance to 
law, at least when it comes to normatively infused folk concepts like causation.
One such argument comes from consequentialist theorists like Paul Robinson, 
who argue that criminal law148 ought to track lay moral intuitions of justice, at least 
                                                                                                                
EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 160–61 (2001) [hereinafter Stapleton, Unpacking Causation]; Tony 
Honoré, Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, 84 PROC. BRITISH ACAD. 295, 304 (1994); Jane 
Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433, 458 
(2008) [hereinafter Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean].
142. See supra Sections II.A−B.
143. MOORE, supra note 23, at 4; see also, e.g., id. at 95 (“This corrective-justice view of 
tort law demands a robustly metaphysical interpretation of cause. For legal liability tracks 
moral responsibility on this view, and moral responsibility is for those harms we cause.”
(emphasis in original)).
144. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 23, at 1; Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean, supra
note 141, at 458−59.
145. See infra notes 308−10 and accompanying text.
146. Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 827,
828 (2000).
147. Id. at 854−56.
148. The point arguably holds for tort law as well, though the torts literature is far less 
developed on this issue. See Theodore Eisenberg & Christoph Engel, Unpacking Negligence 
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in the vast majority of cases, because doing so fosters greater compliance with and 
deference to criminal law on the part of the citizenry149 (not to mention juries with 
nullification power).150 In other words, regardless of what “true” morality is, law 
ought to track lay intuitions of morality because doing so brings about good 
consequences.151
A second argument concerns democratic representativeness. On this view, law (or 
at least criminal and tort law) in a democracy ought to reflect the moral intuitions or 
preferences of its citizens.152 We can glean people’s moral intuitions or preferences 
from their intuitions about concepts that play important roles in moral evaluation; 
                                                                                                                
Liability: Experimentally Testing the Governance Effect, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 116 
(2016).
149. See ROBINSON, supra note 79; PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE,
LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
150. A subtler but more prevalent form of “nullification” may simply be jurors’ 
interpretation of ambiguous instructions in ways that conform to their preferred outcome. This 
need not be, and probably often is not, done consciously. See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. 
Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal 
Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 (2010); Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior & Anup 
Malani, Policy Preferences and Legal Interpretation, 1 J.L. & CTS. 115 (2013).
151. To be sure, Robinson considers lay intuitions a generally good piece of evidence as 
to true morality. See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition 
Between Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2007). But his 
work does not focus on that as a reason for their validity as a guide to forming criminal law 
doctrine.
Of course, if intuitions and ordinary usage concerning causation are mere proxies for 
intuitions about justice and morality, then one might be tempted to skip the proxy and simply 
track lay moral intuitions without regard to causal language. Cf. WILLIAM D. POPKIN,
STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 181 (1999). 
That, however, could run afoul of fair notice and other rule of law requirements. See supra
Section II.B. And by running afoul of those intuitively just notice requirements, it could 
backfire, for there are consequentialist reasons to care about perceptions of procedural justice 
(including perceptions of fair notice). See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE (2d ed. 2006); Janice Nadler, Flouting 
the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005). Still, in a more realistic sense, notice concerns might 
favor direct consideration of lay intuitions of justice (in situations where they differ from 
statutory causation requirements) insofar as general moral intuitions and related assumptions
about the law’s content are likely to be the only actual “notice” that criminal and tort 
defendants receive, and people tend to assume that law tracks their intuitions of justice. See
ARDEN ROWELL, LEGAL RULES, BELIEFS AND ASPIRATIONS (2018), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2903049 [https://perma.cc/2W8E-WUAA]. In any event, 
as a positive matter, direct consideration of lay intuitions of justice (or, more precisely, legal 
actors’ guesses as to the content of those lay intuitions) likely does drive many enforcement 
decisions in criminal and tort contexts. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text; Anna 
Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
152. See, e.g., ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 149; POPULAR PUNISHMENT: ON THE 
NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION (Jesper Ryberg & Julian Roberts eds., 2014); 
see also Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
1367 (2017).
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causation is one such concept.153 So in order to effectively track lay intuitions of 
justice, and thereby give effect to laypeople’s preferences and conceptions of justice 
to an extent befitting a representative democracy, we should, on this view, have 
causation in law track the folk concept of causation.
III. HOW COURTS FIND ORDINARY MEANING
So, to recap, we’ve seen that courts care about ordinary usage of causal language 
that appears in statutes. And we’ve seen why they care—for reasons stemming from 
statutory interpretation generally, criminal and tort law more specifically, and 
causation’s role in criminal and tort law. Now we’ll examine how courts figure out 
the content of these statutory terms and the folk concepts they reflect, using tools 
common throughout modern statutory interpretation. Each of these tools—
introspection and intuition pumps (beloved by judges and philosophers alike, as we’ll 
see in Part V), as well as dictionaries and corpus linguistics—runs into serious 
problems of bias, indeterminacy, and inaccuracy. The deficiencies in courts’ (and 
philosophers’) methods help motivate the experimental study reported in Part IV.
A. Introspection and Intuition Pumps
Introspection is the most common method judges use for ascertaining ordinary 
usage and the content of folk concepts the law invokes. After all, throughout their 
everyday lives judges use and are exposed to many of the words, phrases, and 
concepts at issue in statutory interpretation cases; by consulting their own ordinary 
understanding of the word or phrase, they can quickly and easily get a sense of its 
likely ordinary meaning.154
Still, judges might not do this as reliably and objectively as one would hope. Like 
the rest of us, they might engage in “motivated reasoning” or “motivated intuiting,” 
forming initial intuitions that are biased in favor of their preferred outcome,155 after 
which “confirmation bias” and “consensus bias” will lead them to become more and 
more convinced that their interpretation is normal or ordinary.156 And even absent 
such systematic biases, we may worry that a sample size of one would still be 
inadequate to generate reliable inferences about the linguistic usage and intuitions of 
the public writ large.
Moving from the completely internal to the slightly more external, judges often 
“test” their intuitions against hypothetical or real world examples (“intuition pumps”) 
to see what feels comfortable or intuitive to say.157 The cases above contained various 
                                                                                                                
153. See HART & HONORÉ, supra note 23, at 4; ROBINSON, supra note 79, at 343.
154. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 16 (1993).
155. See Farnsworth et al., supra note 150.
156. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998); Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel 
Osherson, False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008). 
But see Farnsworth et al., supra note 150.
157. See Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambituities and Agency Cases: Reflections After 
(Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 319–22 (2017). 
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examples (the Burrage Court on the cause of a baseball team’s winning,158 the Miller 
court on John’s reason for bringing an umbrella,159 etc.). Using intuition pumps to 
test ordinary meaning is an “often colorful and fun part of the job of statutory 
interpretation,”160 and one that permeates judicial opinions.
Like pure introspection, intuition pumps can be useful, but they pose serious risk 
of bias, rendering them dubious as a guide or constraint on ordinary meaning 
interpretation. Due to confirmation bias (or, more cynically, “intuition pump 
shopping”), judges often discount the probity of intuition pumps that cut in the 
opposite direction from their initial intuition, focusing only on those that confirm 
their priors.161 And while intuition pumps have the virtue of specifying the relevant 
context (e.g., a newspaper sports section reporting on a baseball game,162 a verbal 
explanation of why someone brought an umbrella,163 etc.), subtle differences 
between the context described in the intuition pump and the context it is supposed to 
illuminate may render the intuition pump inapt, sometimes for reasons not apparent 
at first glance.164
B. Dictionaries and Corpus Linguistics
Moving further from the internal and subjective to the external and objective, 
judicial use of dictionaries has become extremely popular165 amongst judges of all 
ideological inclinations and interpretive philosophies.166 As the cases reviewed 
                                                                                                                
158. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 211−12 (2014).
159. United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2014).
160. Kethledge, supra note 157, at 321. As an example, Judge Kethledge describes a recent 
case in which the Sixth Circuit interpreted a criminal statute’s use of the term “inflicted,” 
“testing” their intuitions using six hypothetical examples from ordinary language. Id. at 
321−22. This way, the judges were able to find “the best objective reading” of the text. Id. at 
319−20 (“[I]n my experience at least, if one works hard enough, all the other interpretations 
are eventually revealed as imposters. . . . In my own opinions as a judge, I have never yet had 
occasion to find a statute ambiguous.”); see also Kavanaugh, supra note 110 (advocating a 
similar approach).
161. Compare, e.g., Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211, with MOORE, supra note 23, at 418.
162. See Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211.
163. See Miller, 767 F.3d at 591.
164. See James A. Macleod, Belief States in Criminal Law, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 497, 544 
n.190 (2016).
165. James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst 
for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Era, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 495 (2013);
Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2150 n.158 (“Under the ‘best reading’ inquiry, the question is 
only how the words would be read by an ordinary user of the English language. That’s why 
textualists rely on dictionaries. Dictionaries may not provide authoritative, binding 
interpretations of the language of a statute, but they do tell courts something about how the 
ordinary user of the English language might understand that statutory language.”); Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme 
Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 79 (2010).
166. Brudney & Baum, supra note 165, at 522; Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of 
Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 256–60 (1999).
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above illustrate, it is now common to resort to dictionaries to ascertain the meaning 
not just of technical terms, but also the ordinary meaning of “very ordinary words.”167
There are many scholarly criticisms of judicial dictionary use in statutory 
interpretation;168 here we will note three. The first and most decisive criticism is that
dictionary definitions fail to sufficiently take context into account.169 This first 
criticism thus relates to dictionaries’ accuracy in providing the ordinary meaning of 
a word or phrase as it appears in a given context. The lack-of-context criticism leads 
to a second problem, which concerns dictionaries’ supposed objectivity (and hence, 
their power to constrain judges and reduce bias): with so many acontextual dictionary 
definitions to choose from, judges go “dictionary shopping” to find the one that 
supports their priors when applied in the specific context of the case or statute at 
hand.170 A third and final problem concerns dictionary definitions’ indeterminacy:
they often fail to even address, let alone resolve, the issue of disputed meaning that 
sent judges to the dictionary in the first place.171
                                                                                                                
167. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 117, at 955 (listing examples); Abbe R. Gluck & 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1318 (2018) (listing additional 
examples).  
168. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 165−67.
169. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.); SLOCUM,
supra note 10, at 215; Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort 
to the Dictionary when Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 404−06 
(2003); A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 73−74 (1994).
170. See Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal 
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 1333–34 (2017) (claiming that the ability to pick 
from different dictionary definitions “negates whatever objectivity there is in using a 
dictionary”); SLOCUM, supra note 10, at 215.
171. For example, in Gross and other cases discussed in Part I, the Court majority quoted 
dictionary definitions of “because,” alleging that they bolstered its conclusion that the phrase 
implies but-for causation. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). But in 
Gross, the dictionaries defined “because of” as “on account of” and “by reason of”—
definitions the dissenting Justices understandably considered unilluminating. Id. (quoting 1
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 746 (1933); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132 
(1966)). Nor do the definitions of those new terms (“on account of” and “by reason of”) shed 
any additional light, since the same dictionaries define them as “because of,” leaving us back 
where we started. On account of, THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1967) (defining “on account of” as “by reason of; because of” (emphasis added)); 
By reason of, THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1967) (defining 
“by reason of” as “on account of; because of”) (emphasis added); On account of, SHORTER 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2002) (defining “on account of” as “because of”); By reason 
of, SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2002) (defining “by reason of” as “on account 
of”); On account of, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961) (defining “on 
account of” as “for the sake of: by reason of: because of” (emphasis added)). See Brief of the 
Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, the Employment Justice 
Center, and Employment Litigators as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, at 7−8, Univ. 
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (No. 12-484).
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In light of these criticisms, some scholars have recently advocated using “corpus 
linguistics” as an alternative method of ascertaining ordinary meaning172 and 
predicted that it will “revolutionize” statutory interpretation.173 Corpus linguistics 
involves analysis of large databases of text (“corpora”).174 These corpora contain 
“naturally occurring” language—books, newspaper articles, transcriptions of public 
speeches, and other publicly available texts.175 Legal scholars drawing on corpus 
linguists search corpora for a given word or phrase to ascertain the frequency with 
which it is used in a given manner.176 When faced with a dispute over which of two 
candidate meanings is ordinary, they count how many times the corpus contains 
each.177 This frequency data is typically said to show which usage is ordinary and 
                                                                                                                
172. For general introductions, see Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging 
Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018); Symposium, Law and Corpus Linguistics,
BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). In a few statutory interpretation cases, the Utah and 
Michigan Supreme Courts have used corpus linguistics, generating yet greater interest in the 
field. E.g., People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Mich. 2016) (interpreting the meaning of 
“information”); State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Utah 2015) (interpreting the meaning 
of “discharge a firearm”).
173. Amanda Kae Fronk, Big Lang at BYU, BYU MAG., Summer 2017 (quoting Lawrence 
Solum), https://magazine.byu.edu/article/big-lang-at-byu [https://perma.cc/952G-DMMN].
174. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 172, at 795.
175. Id. Some corpora are specialized in subject matter (e.g., corpora containing only legal 
opinions) or in timeframe of source material (e.g., corpora containing texts published only 
during the decades surrounding the drafting of the U.S. Constitution). See, e.g., Thomas R. 
Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167 PA. L. REV. 261 (2019).
176. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 172, at 831.
177. See, e.g., Solan & Gales, supra note 109, at 258. For example, Solan and Gales 
analyzed the meaning of “defraud,” for purposes of interpreting the federal bank fraud statute 
in Shaw v. United States, a case then pending before the Supreme Court. The question in Shaw
was whether the defendant “defrauded” a bank when he deceived that bank into transferring 
money from one of its customers to the defendant, where the bank (unlike its customer) 
ultimately bore no loss of property. Solan and Gales consulted 321 instances of the word 
“defraud” in the Corpus of Historical American English and determined that, in 98% of the 
instances of “defraud,” the party being “defrauded” was the one who ultimately bore the loss 
of the property at issue. The “ordinary meaning” of “defraud,” the authors therefore concluded, 
did not encompass the defendant’s deception of the bank, since the bank was not the one who 
lost property in the end. Id. at 273.
The Supreme Court instead held, in a unanimous opinion, that the defendant did “defraud” 
the bank, explaining that the bank needn’t “ultimately suffer financial harm” to constitute a 
“defrauded” party, so long as the defendant’s deception had the effect of at least temporarily 
depriving the bank of property rights, including, e.g., the property rights a bailee possesses 
with respect to a bailor’s property. Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 466–68, 470 (2016).
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which is non-ordinary,178 and to do so with greater accuracy, objectivity, and 
determinacy than dictionaries and other traditional methods.179
Corpus linguistics may indeed represent an improvement over intuitions and 
dictionaries in terms of both objectivity and determinacy (though to be sure, it does 
present its own problems with respect to both).180 But the bigger challenge for corpus 
linguistics in legal interpretation concerns the method’s accuracy—that is, whether 
it provides data about the sort of thing courts do or should seek to track when they 
engage in ordinary meaning analysis. 
Here is the problem. Ordinary meaning analysis does not and should not concern 
the frequency of a given usage per se, nor especially frequency data of the relatively 
decontextualized sort that corpus linguistics provides. More specifically, proponents 
of corpus linguistics in legal interpretation typically treat “ordinary meaning” as a 
question about “the relative frequency of competing senses of a given term” in 
reported usage.181 But that is not what ordinary meaning analysis typically does or 
should seek; rather, it seeks the “sense of a word or phrase that is most likely 
implicated in a given linguistic context.”182 Proponents of corpus linguistics 
sometimes conflate the two,183 but they may be quite different, for at least the 
                                                                                                                
178. Solan & Gales, supra note 109, at 263 (“‘Ordinary meaning,’ especially as applied to 
particular words and phrases, is a distributional fact.”); see also Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 
172, at 829 (“ordinary meaning” concerns “the relative frequency of competing senses of a 
given term”).
179. See, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus 
Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 
174–75, 202, 205 (2011); Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 172, at 831.
180. As to objectivity, corpus linguistics can provide replicable, falsifiable results, but bias 
remains a problem throughout the coding that produces those results, as the coder may be
faced with difficult decisions regarding which instances of a given word or phrase count as 
instances of one of the candidate types of usage as opposed to the other. (Imagine, for example, 
the difficulties one would face in attempting to code instances of the word “because” according 
to whether the cause to which they referred was a but-for cause or not.) Each discrete coding 
decision presents potential room for infiltration of bias. See Mouritsen, supra note 179, at 202.
As for determinacy, corpus linguistics can at least get judges arguing about the same thing, 
rather than talking past each other with dictionary definitions that fail to even bear on the 
interpretive question at hand. That is because whereas dictionaries were not designed to
disambiguate between the relevant senses of the word under dispute, corpus searches can be 
constructed to address the precise problem at issue. Still, where multiple judges perform 
analyses of even the same corpora, they may often differ in their interpretation of the results, 
rendering the method at least somewhat indeterminate. In the first and most extensive example 
of courts using corpus linguistics, for example, all justices of Utah’s supreme court weighed 
in on the results of Justice Lee’s corpus linguistics analysis, but they were deeply divided as 
to the implications of his findings for the statutory meaning at issue and the applicability of 
the rule of lenity. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258 (Utah 2015); see also People v. Harris, 
885 N.W.2d 832 (Mich. 2016).
181. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 172, at 829; see also Solan & Gales, supra note 109, at 
263 (“‘Ordinary meaning,’ especially as applied to particular words and phrases, is a 
distributional fact.”).
182. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 172, at 795 (emphasis added).
183. Of course, relatively de-contextualized frequency of the sort addressed by corpus 
linguistics may often be probative evidence of ordinary meaning in the sense I describe in this 
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following reasons: relative frequency in the corpus may simply reflect the frequency 
of the underlying phenomenon184 or the newsworthiness of its occurrence185 in the 
time and place generating the sources that form the corpus186—yet those things 
should not influence our ordinary meaning determination.187 If it were to turn out, 
for example, that but-for causes occur more often or are more frequently reported on 
than other sorts of causes, we should not conclude that they are the only kind of 
“cause,” nor even that they are the most likely kind of “cause” implicated in a given 
statutory or factual context.
In any event, as we saw with respect to the cases discussed in Par I, courts’ 
ordinary meaning analysis tends to focus on whether or not it feels “natural” or 
“appropriate” to apply a given term or phrase to a particular example,188 rather than 
focusing on the frequency with which situations like those described in the example 
arise.189 And for good reasons—namely, those examined in Part II. A wholly
frequency-based regime like that proposed in much of the law and corpus linguistics 
literature, in other words, would risk undermining many of the values that support 
                                                                                                                
Article. It may even be more probative than judges’ usual methods, i.e., use of introspection 
supplemented by intuition pumping examples and dictionary definitions. And indeed, in some 
statutory disputes (e.g., concerning terms in old statutes the meaning of which has changed 
significantly over time), relatively decontextualized frequency in sources from the time of 
enactment may be more probative of historical ordinary meaning than would a modern survey 
(that is, it may be more probative, compared to a modern survey, of the likely results that a 
hypothetical survey administered at the time of enactment would have yielded).
184. Ethan J. Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 
116–17 (2017). But see Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 172, at 874 (contending that frequency 
of the underlying phenomenon reveals the word meaning or sense that “seems likely to be the 
one that first comes to mind when we think of” the word or phrase at issue, and for reasons of 
fair notice, ordinary meaning interpretation ought to track only that “top-of-mind” sense). On 
the tendency of corpus linguistic approaches to favor interpretations that do not extend much 
beyond prototypical usage of disputed terms, see Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Public Meaning: 
Are Dictionaries and Corpus Linguistics Reliable Measures of Meaning? (2019) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3266082 [https://perma.cc/8J4Q-R9NW].   
185. See Herenstein, supra note 184, at 118–19.
186. See Solan & Gales, supra note 109, at 259.
187. Herenstein, supra note 184, at 116. On potential uses of corpus linguistics in legal 
interpretation that do not fall prey to these frequency-based critiques, see NEAL GOLDFARB,
CORPUS LINGUISTICS IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHEN IS IT (IN)APPROPRIATE? (2019) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3333512 [https://perma.cc/6UBS-BQEN].
188. See e.g., Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 891 (2014); Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 
63–64, n.14 (2007)); id. at 180; Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Johnson v. 
United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he acid test of whether a 
word can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word in that sense 
at a cocktail party without having people look at you funny.”).
189. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU L. 
REV. 1503, 1506 (arguing that corpus linguistics’ exclusive focus on “how frequently a term 
is used in a particular way . . . represent[s] [a] significant departure[] from current theories of 
statutory interpretation”).
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ordinary meaning interpretation in the first place, especially as they relate to criminal 
and tort law.190 As one scholar recently put the point,
Proponents of corpus linguistics believe that the frequency with which 
words are used in various non-legal publications can tell us how a 
member of the public would understand those words when they appear 
in statutes. While there are good reasons for courts to interpret statutes—
especially criminal statutes—in a fashion that is consistent with how an 
ordinary member of the public would understand the statute, the 
frequency with which a term is used does not give us that information.191
What, then, would give us that information?
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF ORDINARY MEANING AND CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
This Part proposes a novel answer: to determine how ordinary speakers would 
apply a disputed word, phrase, or concept in a given context, ask them to apply it and 
observe what they do. More specifically, ask a lot of them, and do so via a controlled 
experiment, so that subtle variations (in precise wording, in factual context, etc.) can 
be altered as needed to ensure that the results are robust and informative. Before 
demonstrating the approach in action, let’s briefly examine why it holds promise as 
an improvement over introspection, intuition pumps, dictionaries, and corpus 
linguistics.
A. Advantages and Limitations of Experimental Statutory Interpretation
Recall that, as a method of ascertaining ordinary meaning, judicial introspection 
faced problems stemming from its sample size of one—an unreliable basis for 
drawing inferences about the general population, especially insofar as the judge’s 
own biases and motivated reasoning distort the analysis. Survey experiments, on the 
other hand, can actually sample the general population, letting idiosyncratic 
intuitions and biases cancel each other out. As for less idiosyncratic biases, much 
irrelevant and potentially biasing information—for example, the defendant’s skin 
color—can simply be omitted from the experimental materials, unlike in a bench or 
jury trial.192 Other possible influences on interpretation (e.g., anti-drug-dealer 
sentiment in interpreting the CSA’s penalty provisions) can be experimentally 
manipulated or controlled for to the extent they represent biases.193
Intuition pumps, like introspection, similarly fare poorly in terms of objectivity: 
due to the realities of “intuition pump shopping,” they provide very little constraint 
and present significant risk of bias. And recall that intuition pumps run into accuracy 
problems due to the potential for subtle disanalogy in factual or linguistic context 
(though, to their credit, intuition-pumping examples at least make that surrounding 
                                                                                                                
190. Id. (discussing notice and accountability); see also supra Sections II.B–C.
191. Hessick, supra note 189, at 105–06; cf. Baude & Sachs, supra note 10, at 1144–45;
Fallon, supra note 10, at 1246.
192. Cf. Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867 (2018).
193. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B.3.b.
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context explicit). Again, survey experiments represent an improvement in both 
accuracy and objectivity because they can ask participants about the actual situation 
and wording in question. To the extent one suspects that the survey has presented 
participants with some subtly disanalogous variation of the linguistic and factual 
context, one can manipulate those features via controlled experiment to reveal 
whether they do in fact render the survey results untrustworthy. And of course, to the 
extent one suspects that the survey creator has engaged in another sort of 
“shopping”—namely, running multiple surveys and reporting only the results that 
support her position—replication tests and other devices can help separate the 
reliable from the unreliable (as they already do in areas like trademark law, where 
courts routinely consider expert witnesses’ dueling surveys).194
As for dictionaries, recall that they risked serious inaccuracy, and raised related 
objectivity concerns, due to their failure to sufficiently account for factual and 
linguistic context, whereas surveys are constructed to include the relevant context. 
And recall that dictionary definitions often fail to even address the disputed aspect 
of the word or phrase at issue. Survey experiments, on the other hand, can be 
designed to disambiguate between the candidate meanings at issue in an actual case. 
And even when they do not clearly favor one position over another, surveys, unlike 
dictionaries, can at least reveal the extent to which a given term is vague or 
ambiguous in the context at issue—a relevant consideration in criminal law given 
rules like lenity and void-for-vagueness.195
Finally, while corpus linguistics may in many cases roughly equal survey 
experiments in terms of objectivity and determinacy, survey experiments allow for 
comparatively greater accuracy, because they track actual usage in a very specific 
and controlled context, rather than frequency of usage across all contexts represented 
in the corpus (which in any event may reflect irrelevant factors such as the frequency 
of the underlying event and its newsworthiness).196
Of course, no method of ascertaining ordinary meaning is perfect, and it is worth 
examining some limitations on survey experiments before finally observing them in 
action. First, surveys test current usage and concepts, not historical ones; where folk 
usage and concepts have substantially shifted postenactment, surveys are likely to be 
less useful.197 Still, such cases may be relatively unusual.198 Indeed, courts—like 
                                                                                                                
194. See Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1807–08; Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa 
Larrimore Ouellette, Public Perceptions of Government Speech, 2017-2 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 59–
60 (2017).
195. See supra notes 131, 133 and accompanying text; infra notes 261–66 and 
accompanying text.
196. Whereas corpus linguistics’ focus on relatively de-contextualized frequency data may 
give rise to notice concerns, see notes 184–90 and accompanying text, surveys directly answer 
the question of notice: if someone contemplating whether to do x had looked dispassionately 
at the relevant statutory provision, would they have understood it to apply to x? Indeed, it is 
hard to imagine a method more suited to addressing notice concerns.
197. Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 22 (2015).
198. For especially old statutes, and for disputes over statutory terms that one has reason 
to suspect have changed considerably over time, corpus linguistics may well provide 
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philosophers, psychologists, and everyday folk—rightly treat many everyday 
concepts as stable over fairly broad stretches of time, especially core concepts like 
“knowledge,”199 “intent,”200 and “causation,”201 and core logical terms like “any,” 
“if,” and “would.”202 Hence judges’ (and philosophers’, psychologists’, etc.) frequent 
recourse to their own, present-day intuitions and linguistic usage when determining 
ordinary meaning even as a historical matter.203 In any event, the historical drift 
concern is of little moment for the causation language found in recently enacted 
legislation such as the criminal sentencing, hate crime, and discrimination statutes 
considered in Part I and tested below.204
Second, even though surveys have become increasingly cheap to conduct online, 
they still cost money (a few thousand dollars for a large-scale, nationally 
representative survey like the one reported below). Granted, this is a drop in the 
bucket for many litigants.205 Still, for most cases, courts and litigants will continue 
to deem introspection, intuition pumps, and dictionaries sufficient, and this will often 
be perfectly sensible in light of cost concerns. Here again, though, investigating core 
psychological concepts and logical terms avoids much of the worry: the very fact 
that these terms appear throughout federal and state codes, and that even their 
appearance in a single place like Title VII can form the basis of so many discrete 
cases, means that experimental research can have a potentially large and wide-
ranging payoff. Insofar as parties and courts lack the resources and incentives not 
only to carry out experimental research but also to make the results public, academic 
studies can fill some of the void. And even the mere awareness that such data may 
someday be forthcoming might usefully temper the temptation (whether on the part 
of judges, lawyers, legal theorists, or philosophers) to treat arguments from ordinary 
                                                                                                                
significantly more probative evidence of original public meaning than surveys would provide. 
See supra note 188.
199. Cf. Macleod, supra note 164.
200. Cf. Julia Kobick, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality 
and Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517 (2010).
201. Cf. sources cited supra notes 36–68; sources cited infra notes 311–18.
202. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 117, at 955 (citing additional examples).
203. See infra notes 270–77 and accompanying text (discussing the folk concept of 
“punishment”). For examples of cross-cultural (as opposed to inter-temporal) uniformity in 
folk conceptual understandings concerning what I’ve labeled “core” folk concepts and logical 
terms, see sources cited in Knobe & Nichols, supra note 25, § 2.1.1.
204. The provision of the CSA at issue in Burrage was enacted in 1970. Burrage v. United 
States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014). The ADEA, at issue in Gross, was enacted in 1967. Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs, 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). Title VII, at issue in Nassar, was enacted in 1964. 
Changes to other parts of Title VII that could arguably have altered the meaning or implication 
of the causal language at issue in Nassar took place in 1991. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). The HCPA, at issue in Miller, was enacted in 2009. United States 
v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585 (2014).
205. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. And in trademark law and several 
other areas, private parties already routinely pay for and introduce via expert witnesses survey 
evidence similar to that reported below—indeed, they did so even before today’s (far less 
expensive) online surveys were possible. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1769–
70, 1805–08. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:158 (Thomson Reuters 5th ed. 2017).
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meaning, plain meaning, and “commonsense” intuitions as if they are immune from 
rigorous criticism.
* * *
In sum, then, although not every statutory case, term, or concept will warrant 
experimental examination, the case for surveys is at its strongest for recent 
legislation, such as the statutory tort and criminal legislation discussed in Part I, and 
with respect to everyday folk concepts like causation. Here, in other words, is an area 
where litigants, judges, and (as we’ll see in Part V) even legal theorists and 
philosophers could benefit from empirical data. Yet despite the plentiful armchair 
theorizing about causation in law, there is surprisingly little publicly available 
empirical research on point.206
B. The Experiments
Having argued for the experimental method’s potential as a way of determining 
ordinary meaning, this Part now offers a demonstration. It describes a proof-of-
concept survey based on statutory causation cases discussed in Part I. After 
explaining who the survey’s participants were, how it was designed, and what 
materials were used, it reports the results and examines what they reveal about the 
ordinary meaning of causal language and about courts’ ordinary meaning decisions
more broadly.
1. Participants
The survey was administered online to a nationally representative sample 
recruited by Toluna, a well-regarded survey research firm with an established 
                                                                                                                
206. The only study in the legal literature concerning whether uninstructed laypeople 
ascribe causality in the absence of but-for causation is from 2001. See Spellman & Kincannon, 
supra note 72. The authors tested an overdetermined murder scenario (two shooters 
simultaneously kill one victim). Participants (an unspecified number of college students) 
ascribed greater causality and assigned greater punishment in the overdetermined double-
murderer scenario than in the alternative scenario where death would not have resulted if either 
shot had missed. Id. at 253. In the late 1990s, Erich J. Greene and John Darley tested 
punishment preferences, but not causality ascription, in a similar two-murderer scenario where 
but-for causation was present and each murderer’s contribution was either independently 
sufficient or insufficient to cause the victim’s death. See Erich J. Greene and John M. Darley,
Effects of Necessary, Sufficient, and Indirect Causation on Judgments of Criminal Liability,
22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 429 (1998) (finding that, where but-for causation is satisfied, 
independently sufficient murderers were allotted more punishment than independently 
insufficient murderers); see also ROBINSON, supra note 79, at 392 (noting the need for further 
research on this point); cf. infra note 311 (citing sources critical of Hart and Honoré and 
subsequent work on causal intuitions in law as lacking empirical support beyond the authors’ 
own intuitions).
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panel.207 The sample consisted of 1486 participants,208 and was closely matched with 
U.S. census data to be representative on gender, age, race, ethnicity, and education.209
Participants were not told that the study had anything to do with law or 
interpretation.210 The study was conducted with the approval of the Columbia 
University Institutional Review Board. 
2. Design and Materials
Each participant was randomly assigned to read a short vignette modeled on one 
of the three main cases examined in Part I—specifically, Burrage (did death “result 
from” the drug sold by the protagonist?); Miller (did the protagonist assault the 
victim “because of” the victim’s religion?); and Gross (did the protagonist terminate 
the employee “because of” the employee’s age?).211 (As explained below, a fourth 
vignette mirrored the Burrage vignette but with slight variations that eliminated the 
impulse to morally blame.212) For ease of reference, call the drug, the religious 
hatred, and the ageism the “focal causes” in each vignette (as opposed to the 
“nonfocal causes,” which were, respectively, the other drugs the victim took in 
Burrage, the other motivations the attacker had for assaulting the victim in Miller,
and the other reasons the employer had for firing the employee in Gross). 
                                                                                                                
207. See About Toluna Group, TOLUNA, https://www.toluna-group.com/about-toluna
-group/about [https://perma.cc/EP25-MW2A].
208. From an initial sample of 1722, 236 participants were screened out based on 
prespecified criteria, leaving 1486. Specifically, participants who finished the survey in less 
than one-third of the median completion time (as fifty-five participants did) were excluded, 
and participants who failed a simple attention check (as 181 participants did) were excluded. 
See infra note 214 for the text of the attention check. 
209. The mean age of the 1486 respondents was 47, with a range of 18–92 and a standard 
deviation of 17 years. Females comprised 50% of the sample. For race, 76% of the sample 
self-identified as White, 12% as Black, 6% as Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander, 1% 
as Native American or Alaska Native, and 6% as Other. On a separate question, 16% of the 
sample reported that they are Latino or Hispanic. For education, 9% of the sample had not 
finished high school, 22% had high school diplomas, 22% had some college experience, 12% 
had 2-year college degrees, 22% had 4-year college degrees, 10% had master’s degrees, and 
3% had doctorates or other professional degrees.
210. One potentially interesting follow-up study would test whether the results change 
when participants are told that the study concerns legal interpretation, and/or when they are 
provided even greater contextual enrichment (e.g., when they are told to imagine that they are 
a juror in a case). 
211. Participants receiving one of the motive-as-cause vignettes (i.e., Miller and Gross)
received both motive-as-cause vignettes, with their order randomized and with the same 
necessity/sufficiency condition across both vignettes. Participants receiving any version of the 
Burrage vignette did not receive another vignette. Participants’ responses to the Miller and 
Gross vignettes showed no statistically significant order effects. Moreover, in all the results 
reported below, neither the direction nor the fact of statistical significance would change if 
one were to first remove from the data all responses to the second vignette a given participant 
received and then recalculate. 
212. See infra Section IV.B.3; App. at 1028.
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The key experimental manipulation for each vignette concerned the focal cause—
specifically, whether the focal cause was necessary or unnecessary to bring about the 
state of affairs in question (i.e., the death, assault, or employment termination), and 
whether the focal cause was independently sufficient or independently insufficient to 
bring about that state of affairs. So, after having been randomly assigned to one of 
the four vignettes (Burrage, Miller, Gross, or the low-blame variation of Burrage), 
participants were randomly assigned one of the four possible necessity/sufficiency 
conditions for that given vignette—namely, focal cause [1] necessary and sufficient; 
[2] necessary and insufficient; [3] unnecessary and sufficient; or [4] unnecessary and 
insufficient. In total, then, participants were randomly assigned to one of 16 possible 
stories (i.e., four vignettes, each of which had four versions). 
As an example, consider the vignette based on Burrage, which is reproduced 
below. The full text of the other vignettes is reproduced in the Appendix. Whereas 
the Miller and Gross vignettes contain only two potential causes, and are thus simpler 
in structure, the vignette based on Burrage contains three—the focal drug (“Fintene”) 
and two other drugs—so as to more closely mirror the facts in most of the “mixed 
drug intoxication” CSA cases cited above, including Burrage itself.213
DRUG OVERDOSE (Burrage):
Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen are dangerous and illegal recreational 
drugs. A typical dose of each makes users feel high. But unusually potent 
doses are very dangerous, and can even be deadly. Drug dealers sell them 
in powder form, in small plastic bags. To take them, users mix the 
powder into a glass of orange juice and drink it. Taken this way, Fintene, 
Rextor, and Tamphen take about an hour to become absorbed into the 
body.
On Tuesday morning, Josh met up with three different drug 
dealers. One sold Josh a dose of Fintene, another sold Josh a dose of 
Rextor, and the other sold Josh a dose of Tamphen. Josh wanted to have 
a good time, so he decided that that afternoon, he would take all three of 
the drugs together.
What Josh didn’t know was that the Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen he 
bought were all unusually potent. In fact, . . .
                                                                                                                
213. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6–9.
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. . . taking all three drugs together would kill Josh.
That afternoon, Josh went home, combined all the powder from all 
three bags, mixed it into a glass of orange juice, and drank it. Sure 
enough, after about an hour, the Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen combined 
in Josh’s bloodstream, blocking the flow of blood to Josh’s heart, and 
Josh died.
After reading whichever vignette they were assigned, participants answered a set 
of questions concerning: the applicable statutory language (for ease of reference, call 
this the “statutory causation” question); common doctrinal standards / jury charges 
interpreting that language (call these the “alternative causation standards” questions); 
and the moral blameworthiness and punishment-worthiness of the actor who would 
later become the defendant (call these the “blameworthiness” questions).214 So, for 
                                                                                                                
214. An attention check question asked, “Which drug or drugs did Josh take?” Participants 
who failed to select the correct answer, “All three of Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen,” were 
excluded. The attention check question for the other vignettes followed this same structure. 
Note that, for those who received Miller and Gross vignettes, responses to questions 
concerning a given vignette remained in the survey results so long as the participant answered 
the attention check question as to that given vignette correctly, even if he or she answered the 
attention check question wrong as to the other vignette he or she received (i.e., even if his or 
her answers in response to the other vignette were excluded). To reiterate, see supra note 211,
this was possible only for participants who received Miller and Gross vignettes because those 
were the only participants who received two vignettes and corresponding sets of questions, 
rather than just one.
[1] Necessary 
& Sufficient
[2] Necessary & 
Insufficient
[3] Unnecessary 
& Sufficient
[4] Unnecessary 
& Insufficient
. . . although 
neither the 
Rextor by itself, 
nor the 
Tamphen by 
itself, nor the 
combination of 
Rextor and 
Tamphen 
together would 
have killed 
Josh, taking the 
Fintene by itself 
would have 
killed Josh. 
And…
. . . although 
neither the 
Fintene by itself 
nor the 
combination of 
the Rextor and 
Tamphen 
together would 
have killed Josh, 
…
. . . the Fintene 
by itself would 
have killed 
Josh, the 
Rextor by itself 
would have 
killed Josh, 
and the 
Tamphen by 
itself would 
have killed 
Josh. Taking 
any two of the 
three drugs 
together would 
also have 
killed Josh.
And…
. . . although 
neither the 
Fintene by 
itself, nor the 
Rextor by itself, 
nor the 
Tamphen by 
itself would kill 
Josh, taking any 
two of the three 
drugs together 
would kill 
Josh. And…
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example, after reading a version of the Burrage vignette a participant would be asked 
whether Josh’s death “resulted from the use of” the Fintene (the statutory causation 
question215); whether Josh would still have died had he not used the Fintene (the but-
for question); whether the use of the Fintene was a “substantial factor in bringing 
about Josh’s death,” and whether it was a “contributing factor” in bringing about his 
death (the alternative causation standards questions216); and how morally 
blameworthy the drug dealer who sold Josh the Fintene was, as well as how much 
prison time he should receive (the blameworthiness questions217).
After each of the statutory causation and alternative causation standards 
questions, participants were also asked how confident they were in their “yes” or 
“no” response (on a scale from 1 (“Not at all confident”) to 7 (“Completely 
confident”)). Finally, participants were asked to predict what percentage of other
survey participants would give the same “yes” or “no” answer to the statutory 
causation question.218 The order of the questions was as follows: (a) statutory 
causation question (followed by the confidence question); (b) in randomized order, 
the but-for causation and alternative causation standards questions (each of which 
was followed by the confidence question); (c) the blameworthiness questions; (d) the 
prediction of how many others agree with the participant’s statutory causation 
answer; and (e) the attention check.
3. Results
a. Statutory Causation and the Failure of the But-For Test
Figure 1 shows participants’ responses to the statutory causation question in the 
Burrage, Miller, and Gross case vignettes. 
                                                                                                                
215. Whereas the operative statutory language in Burrage was “results from,” 134 S. Ct. 
at 887, in Miller and Gross it was “because of,” hence the statutory causation question for the 
Miller and Gross vignettes asked whether the protagonist did something “because of” some 
motivation, 767 F.3d 585; 557 U.S. at 167.
216. In Miller and Gross, in line with the most popular jury instruction standards, the 
substantial factor question concerned whether the focal motive was a “substantial motivating 
factor.” 767 F.3d at 592, 603; 557 U.S. at 171, 183. Since motive-as-cause instructions less 
frequently use a “contributing factor” instruction, the Miller and Gross materials did not 
include that question, whereas the Burrage materials did. Since motive-as-cause cases 
sometimes use a “sole motivating factor” instruction, the Miller and Gross materials included 
that question whereas the Burrage materials did not.
217. Answers to the “morally blameworthy” question were on a forced seven-point scale, 
from 1 (“Not at all blameworthy”) to 7 (“Extremely blameworthy”). Answers to the prison 
question were on a forced seven-point scale, from “0–4 years” to “30–34 years.” Since prison 
time is not an option for age discrimination under the ADEA, the Gross vignette had no prison 
question. 
218. Specifically, using Burrage as an example, “Earlier, when you were asked whether 
Josh’s death “resulted from” the Fintene, you answered [“Yes”/”No”]. 100 other people are 
taking this survey. Out of the 100, how many do you think will also answer [“Yes”/”No”] to 
that same question? (Please provide a number between 0 and 100.).”
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Figure 1. Percentage Ascribing Causation Using Statutory Language 
(Burrage, Miller, Gross combined; N = 1410)
Two main findings stand out in assessing the courts’ but-for test for statutory 
causation. Importantly, both findings apply not just to all three cases (Burrage,
Miller, and Gross) considered together (as pictured in Figure 1 above) but also to 
each of the three cases considered individually (as pictured in Appendix Figures A, 
B, and C). While all three cases are combined here for purposes of exposition, 
interested readers can consult the Appendix to view the results as to the three cases 
individually. Now, on to the two findings.
First, where but-for causation was absent (i.e., where the focal cause was 
unnecessary), a substantial majority (74%) of study participants nonetheless found 
the statute’s causal language to be satisfied (this can be seen by averaging the third 
and fourth bars in Figure 1). Indeed, even considering only the experimental 
condition in which the focal cause was neither necessary nor sufficient, a clear 
majority (60%) of study participants found statutory causation satisfied (as 
represented by the fourth bar in Figure 1).219 In short, the “but-for” test appears to be 
                                                                                                                
219. This first main finding cannot be dismissed as resulting from some sort of 
misunderstanding about whether but-for causation was in fact present. For each vignette, and 
for each experimental condition, most participants answered the but-for question correctly—
including, importantly, the vast majority of those who mistakenly deemed statutory causation 
satisfied in response to a condition where but-for causation was unsatisfied. See App. figs.A, 
B, C. In other words, the very same people ascribing statutory causation in the absence of but-
for causation understood that but-for causation was not satisfied. Indeed, if one removes from 
the sample of those who mistakenly found but-for causation satisfied in conditions [3] and [4], 
where it was in fact not satisfied, statutory causation ascription in those conditions drops by 
only one percent. And the same goes for condition [4] considered by itself—i.e., for the 
condition where “yes” responses to the statutory causation question were most unexpected. 
Stated differently: even in the “unnecessary and independently insufficient” condition of each 
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overly restrictive: most people confidently allege that y “resulted from” x, and that y
occurred “because of” x, while simultaneously and confidently alleging that x was 
not a but-for cause of y.220 This finding directly contradicts the courts’ 
pronouncements about ordinary meaning and common understanding surveyed in 
Section I.A. 
Second, the presence or absence of but-for causation appeared to make far less 
difference in statutory causation ascription than did the presence or absence of 
independent sufficiency. Specifically, whereas statutory causation ascription 
increased by 8% where but-for causation was present, it increased by 41% where 
independent sufficiency was present.221 Again, this is striking given that the cases in 
                                                                                                                
vignette (i.e., condition [4]), one could exclude all responses from those who mistakenly 
deemed but-for causation satisfied, and it would still clearly remain the case that, of the 
remaining participants, most deem statutory causation satisfied (for Burrage, 58%; Miller,
58%; and Gross, 60%). Considering all three cases together—and, once again, excluding all 
those participants who mistakenly ascribed but-for causation—an average of 59% of the 
remaining participants ascribed statutory causation even in condition [4]. A chi-squared test 
shows that that 59% average is significantly different from 50%. χ2(1,N=323)=9.365, 
p=0.002. 
A chi-square test is a statistical analysis used to examine the relationship between two 
discrete variables. The null hypothesis generates expected frequencies that are tested against 
the observed frequencies. If the frequencies are similar, the null hypothesis is not rejected; if 
they are sufficiently different, the null hypothesis can be rejected. In what follows, all 
dichotomous measures (i.e., binary “yes” or “no” responses) were statistically analyzed using 
chi-square tests.
220. See supra note 219; infra Section IV.B.3.d.
221. Adding necessity increased statutory causation attribution from 74% to 80%: 
χ2(1,N=1410)=5.837, p=0.015. Independently, adding sufficiency increased statutory 
causation attribution from 64% to 90%: χ2(1,N=1410)=139.441, p<0.001.
A note of caution is perhaps in order, lest we too hastily conclude that independent 
sufficiency is truly fundamental to commonsense causal cognition. Consider an alternative 
explanation for the data regarding the importance of independent sufficiency. It could be that, 
rather than independent sufficiency per se doing the work, independent sufficiency is instead 
functioning as a mere indicator from which participants infer the absolute amount of the focal 
cause that’s present. So, for example, in the Burrage vignette participants are not told the 
quantity of the drug that was sold—it could have been 5 milligrams, 100 milligrams, etc. 
Perhaps participants who are told that the drug was independently sufficient to bring about the 
death assume something closer to 100 milligrams, whereas participants who are told that the 
drug was independently insufficient assume something closer to 5 milligrams. And perhaps it 
is that assumption (rather than the presence or absence of independent sufficiency per se) that 
leads participants in the independently sufficient conditions to more readily ascribe causation. 
I’m skeptical of this alternative explanation, but the data here do not rule it out. And note that 
it is arguably a less dubious explanation as applied to motive-as-cause cases like Gross. So, 
for example, in the Gross vignette, participants were not told the absolute amount of ageism 
present in the employer’s mind (just as, in Burrage, they were not told the absolute amount of 
the drug that was sold); perhaps when participants learn that the employer’s ageism was 
independently sufficient to lead him to fire an employee, they infer that he is very ageist, and 
again, perhaps it is that assumption—an assumption about the absolute amount of the 
forbidden motive present in the mind of the actor—that leads them to more readily ascribe 
causation where independent sufficiency is present as opposed to absent. Again, the data here 
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Section I.A focused exclusively on but-for causation and either neglected to address 
or actively rejected sufficiency as a factor in commonsense or statutory causal 
attribution.
b. Alternative Causation Tests 
If, contrary to the cases described in Section I.A, a but-for standard so 
significantly diverges from the most natural interpretation of the relevant statutory 
language, then the question arises: do any of the three alternative causation tests 
examined in Section I.B (“contributing factor,” “substantial factor,” and “sole 
cause”) fare any better?
Figure 2. Percentage Ascribing Causation Using Statutory Language Compared to 
Alternative Causation Standards (Burrage, Miller, Gross combined; N = 1410)222
Neither the “sole cause” nor the “contributing factor” test fares especially well 
(though the contributing factor test does come closer to tracking statutory causation 
ascription than does the “but-for” test). More specifically, as shown in Figure 2, the 
sole cause test is uniformly—and drastically—underinclusive in all four 
necessity/sufficiency conditions (this can be seen by comparing, in each of the four 
clusters of bars, the height of the first bar versus the height of the last bar). And the 
contributing factor test—despite faring slightly better than the but-for test—is 
                                                                                                                
don’t address, let alone rule out, this alternative explanation for the influence of independent 
sufficiency.
222. Error bars represent .95 confidence intervals.
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uniformly over-inclusive (as can be seen by comparing the first bar in each cluster 
with the second-to-last bar). 
The “substantial factor” test (represented by the middle bar in each cluster) comes 
closer to tracking statutory causation ascription across the four cases than does any 
of the other tests—including, most importantly, the but-for test (represented by the 
second bar in each cluster).223 And again, although all three of the cases (Burrage,
Miller, and Gross) have been collapsed together in Figure 2 for ease of exposition, 
this finding concerning the substantial factor test’s superior performance also applies 
to each of the three cases considered individually, as shown in Appendix Figures A, 
B, and C.
c. Tracking Blame, but Not Merely Blaming
Participants’ moral blame judgments and punishment preferences both tracked 
statutory causation ascription (and the “substantial factor” test) more closely than 
they tracked but-for causation.224 Put another way, moral blame and punishment 
                                                                                                                
223. This can be seen by comparing the first bar in each of the four clusters with, on the 
one hand, the second bar (representing but-for responses), and on the other hand, the third bar 
(representing substantial factor responses). 
Importantly, the same result appears when one examines individual survey participants’ 
responses to the three questions: A given participant was more likely to provide the same 
answer (whether “yes” or “no”) to (a) both the statutory causation question and the substantial 
factor question, than to (b) both the statutory causation question and the but-for question. In 
other words, individual survey participants treated the latter pair of questions as asking about 
two different things, calling for two different answers; they treated the former pair of questions 
as asking the same thing, calling for the same answer. This can be seen using McNemar’s test, 
a form of chi-square that tests the significance of the difference between two responses made 
by the same participants. Condition [1]: statutory - but-for χ2(1,N=349)=53.149, p<0.001; 
statutory - substantial factor χ2(1,N=349)=2.207, p<0.137. Condition [2]: statutory - but-for 
χ2(1,N=337)=0.814, p=0.367; statutory - substantial factor χ2(1,N=337)=32.078, p<0.001. 
Condition [3]: statutory - but-for χ2(1,N=355)=278.170, p<0.001; statutory - substantial factor 
χ2(1,N=355)=0.063, p=0.801. Condition [4]: statutory - but-for χ2(1,N=369)=144.310, 
p<0.001; statutory - substantial factor χ2(1,N=369)=26.353, p<0.001. 
As can be seen in Figure 2 and in these McNemar test results, the single exception to the 
substantial factor test’s superior performance is Condition [2]. There, the but-for test yielded 
results closer to the statutory causation language than did the substantial factor test—which, 
surprisingly, yielded higher causal attribution than the but-for test here as well as in the other 
condition in which but-for causation was in fact satisfied. To the extent judges are worried 
about false positives in cases of necessary and independently insufficient causes (it’s not clear 
why they would be), in a case where the evidence cannot support a determination that the focal 
cause was anything other than necessary and independently insufficient, the but-for test could 
be a better bet, though this is unclear.
224. For example, participants found the protagonists in the vignettes significantly less
morally blameworthy, and allotted significantly less prison time, where the focal cause was 
[2] a but-for cause but not independently sufficient, compared to where the focal cause was 
[3] not a but-for cause but was independently sufficient. Scale measures (i.e., 1 to 7 for moral 
blameworthiness 0 to 34 years for prison sentences), were analyzed using analyses of variance. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a statistical test that examines the relationship between 
a discrete independent variable and a continuous dependent variable by comparing the 
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preferences tend to reflect the same basic pattern that statutory causation and 
substantial factor ascription followed, not the pattern that but-for causation ascription 
followed.225
While many theorists would be happy to learn that statutory causation language 
tracks moral blame and punishment preferences (and unhappy to learn that the 
courts’ but-for test does not),226 others might worry that moral blame and punishment 
preferences are somehow distorting the experimental results, rendering them 
untrustworthy as sources of information about causal intuitions and ordinary 
meaning (as opposed to merely information about moral blame and punishment 
preferences).227
Here are two versions of that type of worry. First, some might worry that, in all 
four necessity/sufficiency conditions, survey participants’ “yes” responses were 
                                                                                                                
variances (averages of the squared deviations from the mean) in order to evaluate the 
probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis that the predicted experimental effect is absent. 
Here are the results comparing condition [2] to [3]: Moral blame: F(1, 690)=13.804, p<0.001;
Prison Sentence: F(1, 469)=14.367, p<0.001. Separating out the three individual cases, these 
effects were in the same direction in all three but statistically significant only in the Burrage
vignette. For Burrage, where the focal cause was unnecessary and sufficient, the mean 
blameworthiness assessment was 6.0, where the focal cause was necessary and insufficient, 
4.8. This was a highly significant difference. F(1,246)=29.522, p<0.001. Prison sentences 
followed the same pattern, with mean sentences of 18.5 years compared to 11.5 years, also 
highly significant. F(1,246)=23.521, p<0.001. However, in Miller and Gross,
blameworthiness and punishment preferences were too clustered around the top of the 
blameworthiness scale to show significant differences (in Miller, 6.6 vs. 6.5, F(1, 223)=0.036, 
p=0.85; in Gross, 5.3 vs. 5.2, F(1, 217)=0.293, p=0.59), and in the hate crime prison sentences, 
were too clustered around the bottom of the scale (6.5 years vs. 6 years, F(1, 223)=0.195, 
p=0.66). (In Gross, which concerns civil employment discrimination, participants were not 
asked to allot prison time.) Future research might usefully employ a nonlinear scale, or at least 
a scale with lower prison sentences where less serious crimes are tested, to avoid similar 
clustering. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 79, at 392.
225. This means, in effect, that like in Figure 1, the blameworthiness and punishment 
ratings are, very roughly speaking: [1] = high; [2] = low; [3] = high; [4] = low. Here, more 
precisely, are the mean moral blameworthiness ratings in the four necessity/sufficiency 
conditions, combining all three case vignettes: [1] = 5.66; [2] = 5.48; [3] = 5.96; [4] = 5.27. 
Here are the mean punishment preference (i.e., prison time) ratings in the four 
necessity/sufficiency conditions, combining the two criminal case vignettes (Burrage and 
Miller, i.e., the only two vignettes for which the question was asked): [1] = 3.39; [2] = 2.77; 
[3] = 3.47; [4] = 3.04.
226. See supra Section II.C.
227. For more information about blame-based motivated reasoning and “blame-first” error 
theories of causal attribution, see Mark D. Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom, Causation, 
Norm Violation, and Culpable Control, 108 J. PHIL. 670, 675 (2011). To be clear, virtually 
nobody thinks commonsense causal intuitions have nothing to do with picking out factors 
“responsible” for some occurrence. But responsibility isn’t necessarily the same as moral 
blameworthiness (or punishment deservingness). The error theory under consideration in the 
text relates to the influence of the desire to morally blame and/or to punish, not the 
(uncontroversial) influence of responsibility judgments per se. Hence this Article’s frequent 
use of “moral blame” as opposed to merely “blame,” in case “blame” could be mistaken for 
mere “responsibility.”
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“inflated” by their impulse to express moral condemnation. That first worry concerns 
across-the-board, uniform inflation of the rate of “yes” responses.228 The second 
worry concerns the pattern of “yes” responses across the four necessity/sufficiency 
conditions—specifically, whether sufficiency would make less of a difference in 
statutory causation attribution (compared to necessity) if the impulse to morally 
blame and punish were absent. For those who feel moral blame and punishment 
preferences ought not to influence statutory causation ascription, the upshot of these 
worries—if they were to find empirical support—could be that the judges endorsing 
the but-for entailment thesis in the cases in Section I.A were not so wrong after all. 
Indeed, perhaps judges would thus be shown to be experts at setting aside their moral 
blame and punishment impulses and seeing the ordinary meaning of the relevant 
language (which, on this theory, really does entail but-for causation), whereas 
laypeople’s interpretive intuitions are clouded by the moral valence of the particular 
case (leading them to over-ascribe causation, and to do so especially in cases where 
independent sufficiency is present). The question, though, is whether either worry is 
warranted as an empirical matter.
To test these two types of worry, some participants received a version of the 
Burrage vignette that was virtually identical in structure and wording, except that it 
was tweaked to diminish the impulse to morally blame or punish. Specifically, it 
substituted the original vignette’s illegal drug for plant food, the blameworthy drug 
dealer for a blameless gardening store, and the death of a human victim for the death 
of a houseplant.229 Again, the goal was to measure whether participants’ statutory 
causation attributions would look roughly the same—both in across-the-board 
magnitude (the first worry) and in pattern of responses to necessity and sufficiency 
(the second worry)—in a context that did not trigger their impulse to punish or 
express moral condemnation. 
The test worked, and the two worries proved largely unfounded. Participants 
assigned nearly no moral blame,230 yet across the four necessity/sufficiency 
conditions the pattern of “yes” responses to the statutory causation question was 
practically identical to the pattern in the original Burrage vignette.231 To be sure, 
participants ascribed statutory causation (and indeed, all types of causation) at 
somewhat lower rates across all four conditions, consistent with prior research 
concerning the role of moral blame in causality ascription.232 Still, well over half
                                                                                                                
228. Some might be drawn to an extreme form of this worry—specifically, that participants 
simply answered “yes” to all causation questions, since doing so expressed that the protagonist 
was blameworthy. But as shown in Figure 2 above, few participants ascribed causation under 
the “sole cause” test in any of the four conditions, and few ascribed causation under the but-
for test in conditions [3] and [4], where but-for causation was in fact absent. So to the extent 
that blame-based motivated reasoning played a role, see infra notes 237–38 and accompanying 
text, it was clearly not so stark as to result in participants ascribing causation no matter what 
standard they were asked to apply. See supra Figure 2; infra note 229 and accompanying text.
229. See App. at 1028.
230. In Burrage, the mean blameworthiness was 5.3, in the Plant Food version, it was 2.0, 
a highly significant difference. F(1,976)=878.623, p<0.001.
231. See App. figs.A, D.
232. See, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and 
the Psychology of Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255 (2012); see also Thomas F. Icard, Jonathan 
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(59%) continued to ascribe statutory causation absent but-for causation, and they 
were just as confident in their answers as were those who ascribed statutory causation 
in response to the original Burrage vignette.233
In short, even if we assume that moral valence should be completely irrelevant to 
these criminal and tort-like statutes’ proper interpretation, and if we further assume 
that moral valence is irrelevant to commonsense causal cognition properly 
understood, even then but-for causation remains just as poor a proxy for the ordinary 
meaning of the relevant statutory causation language.234
d. Interpreter Confidence as Noise 
Across the board, regardless of vignette or condition, participants tended to 
express a great deal of confidence in their responses to the statutory causation, but-
for causation, and alternative causation standard questions. To be sure, there were 
differences among conditions and questions, but the overall pattern is of mean 
confidence ratings that, on a scale from 1 to 7 with 4 labeled “moderately confident” 
and 7 labeled “completely confident,” remained almost entirely between 5.5 and 6.5. 
Interpreter confidence, in short, does not appear to be a reliable indication of the 
degree to which others share the interpreter’s intuitions.
The more interesting and decisive proof of that point is found in participants’ 
explicit predictions regarding what percentage of survey participants would agree 
with their answer to the statutory causation question. These are shown in Table 1.
                                                                                                                
F. Kominsky & Joshua Knobe, Normality and Actual Causal Strength, 161 COGNITION 80
(2017).
233. See App. fig.D. On the practical implications of these different causality ascription 
rates in the low-blame Burrage vignette, see infra text accompanying notes 245–48.
234. It may even be worse, relative to independent sufficiency, here than in the original 
Burrage vignette: in response to the plant food vignette, while slightly less than half of 
participants (47%) ascribe statutory causation in the unnecessary and insufficient condition, 
that is a greater percentage than the percentage (42%) who ascribe it in the necessary and 
insufficient condition, where but-for causation is satisfied.
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Table 1. Actual Agreement and Predicted Agreement with Statutory Causation 
Responses (Burrage, Miller, Gross combined; N=1410)
Actual
Percentage 
Answering 
YES
Mean 
Estimated
Percentage 
Answering 
YES
Actual
Percentage 
Answering 
NO
Mean 
Estimated
Percentage 
Answering 
NO
[1] Necessary & 
Sufficient 
(N=349)
91% 82% 9% 64%
[2] Necessary & 
Insufficient 
(N=337)
69% 73% 31% 68%
[3] Unnecessary & 
Sufficient 
(N=355)
90% 82% 10% 57%
[4] Unnecessary & 
Insufficient 
(N=369)
59% 72% 41% 72%
Note the significant consensus bias exhibited by the minority of survey 
participants, who found statutory causation lacking (shown in the two bolded far 
right columns). In each of the four conditions, these participants predicted 
(inaccurately) that most people would agree with their interpretation of the relevant 
statutory language—in most instances predicting that more than twice as many 
people share their interpretive intuitions than was actually the case.235
C. Summary and Implications
The above results can be briefly summarized in terms of the following six 
findings. First, across and within all three cases, a clear majority ascribed statutory 
causation absent but-for causation (indeed, even absent both but-for causation and 
independent sufficiency).236 Second, independent sufficiency played a far greater 
                                                                                                                
235. As for the majority of participants—who found statutory causation satisfied in a given 
condition—the results are less clear: on the one hand, where the focal cause was independently 
sufficient, they underestimated agreement; on the other hand, given that over 90% actually did 
find statutory causation in such cases, this underestimation might simply reflect hesitancy to 
predict, say, 100% agreement even in the seemingly clearest of cases. And where the focal 
cause was independently insufficient, participants ascribing statutory causation do predict 
greater agreement than is actually the case, even if the extent of their overestimation is far less 
than that of the minority of participants who found statutory causation absent.
236. Again, this remains true even if one excludes from consideration anybody who 
mistakenly believed but-for causation to be present when it was in fact not present. See supra
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role than did but-for causation in altering statutory causation responses. Third, the 
substantial factor test more closely tracked statutory causation attributions than did 
the but-for test (or, for that matter, the sole cause test or contributing factor test). 
Fourth, participants’ moral blame and punishment preferences likewise reflected 
greater concern with independent sufficiency than with but-for causation, and thus 
tracked the statutory causation language and the substantial factor test more closely 
than the but-for test. Fifth, and more generally, participants adopting a minority 
interpretation of statutory causation language were just as confident in their 
interpretation as those adopting the opposite (majority) interpretation, and 
consistently predicted that theirs was the majority position even thought it was not. 
Sixth, and most generally, participants were responsive to small differences in causal 
language, deeming causation present under some causation standards and absent 
under others (including in high-blame contexts), thereby exhibiting coherent patterns 
of causal attribution not attributable to mere blame-based motivated reasoning.
These results demonstrate that the courts have been incorrect in claiming that but-
for causation tracks the ordinary, plain meaning of the statutory causation language 
at issue in Burrage, Miller, Gross, and other cases concerning similar statutory 
language. Whatever degree of obviousness suffices for ordinariness and plainness
sufficient to resolve disputed statutory meaning without recourse to other interpretive 
resources,237 it cannot be that most people disagree with the purportedly obvious 
interpretation.238 This is especially so where alternative interpretations (e.g., the 
                                                                                                                
note 219.
237. Cf. Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2137–38 (describing different approaches to 
doctrines like Chevron that turn on an initial clarity versus ambiguity determination, and 
explaining that, “[i]n practice, I probably apply something approaching a 65-35 rule. In other 
words, if the interpretation is at least 65-35 clear, then I will call it clear and reject reliance on 
ambiguity-dependent canons. I think a few of my colleagues apply more of a 90-10 rule. . . . 
By contrast, I have other colleagues who appear to apply a 55-45 rule. If the statute is at least 
55-45 clear, that’s good enough to call it clear.”); Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law 
Journal), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327038 [https://perma.cc
/EH3S-7CQC].
238. As noted above, this Article does not propose any specific percentage or range of 
percentages of consensus that would support a determination of “plainness” sufficient to 
invoke the plain meaning doctrine. As discussed below, in many interpretive contexts such 
thresholds might shift according to the balance of harms at issue (e.g., the severity of potential 
punishment, the risk of discriminatory enforcement, etc.), among other things. See Hemel & 
Ouellette, supra note 194, at 65–66; Re, supra note 237; Ryan Doerfler, Going “Clear,” (Feb. 
18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3326550 [https://perma.cc/WRS5-RQWP]. In any event, there would be two basic 
approaches to using survey evidence to determine whether any such thresholds are met in a 
given case. One is to simply decide on some threshold level of consensus in the abstract, 
without comparison to any set of controls. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 194, at 65
(noting that, in trademark confusion litigation, “[f]igures over 25% will generally support a 
likelihood-of-confusion finding, though plaintiffs have prevailed on the basis of much weaker 
evidence as well”). The better approach is probably to compare to a set of control survey 
responses—i.e., percentage of survey participants that agree in their interpretations when 
asked to apply language that virtually everybody (all judges, commentators, etc.) agree is 
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“substantial factor” standard, or even an independent sufficiency requirement) come 
so much closer to tracking the statutory language’s application by large majorities of 
interpreters (and, independently, come closer to tracking most people’s intuitions 
concerning moral blameworthiness and punishment).239
This Article doesn’t claim to answer the more complex question of how the cases 
discussed in Part I should come out all things considered. Still, here are a few brief 
remarks about how cases like those described in Part I would come out if courts were 
to adhere to their ordinary meaning rhetoric, but to do so in light of this Article’s 
empirical findings. 
As representative examples, consider Burrage and Gross. In a criminal case like 
Burrage, at least where independent sufficiency is not established, a court concerned 
exclusively with ordinary meaning (as the Burrage majority claimed to be) should 
most likely—contra the actual Burrage majority—apply the rule of lenity in light of 
statutory causation ascription rates of only 57-58% (and perhaps also the 42-47% 
statutory causation ascription rates in the low-blame version of the case).240 The 
choice of lenity as opposed to ordinary and plain meaning is no mere technicality; it 
is consequential for at least the reasons emphasized earlier in this article—namely, 
courts’ tendency to import ordinary and plain meaning determinations into additional 
substantive areas and procedural postures.241 To return to some earlier examples: 
courts would not be treating a lenity-based Burrage decision as if it dictated the 
causation standard for unrelated state and federal civil and criminal statutes simply 
because those statutes also use the phrase “results from”;242 courts would also not be 
employing jury instructions that lack explicit but-for instructions (and upholding 
convictions based on them) on the ground that the “results from” instruction entails 
but-for causation as a matter of ordinary meaning.243
As for statutory tort cases like Gross, a court concerned exclusively with ordinary
meaning (as the Gross majority claimed to be) would—contra the actual Gross
case—uphold liability determinations absent but-for causation and approve more 
permissive jury instructions like the substantial factor or contributing factor 
                                                                                                                
completely clear. See id.; see also Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15, at 1779. The 
survey experiment here provides the sort of data that such an approach would require. For 
example, where the focal cause was both necessary and independently sufficient (and all 
judges and commentators would therefore agree that the statutory language was satisfied), 
around 90% of respondents agreed that the statutory causation language was satisfied. See
App. fig. 2. And on the other hand, where survey participants were asked whether a focal cause 
was the “sole factor” resulting in an outcome, and it clearly was not, fewer than 10% claimed 
that it was. See id. These results suggest that we should not expect 100% agreement even on 
totally clear interpretive issues (and perhaps should expect closer to 90% agreement in such 
cases). 
239. See supra Section IV.B.3.d. 
240. See App. figs.A, D. Where, on the other hand, independent sufficiency is established 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the plain meaning of the statutory language would be deemed 
satisfied and the relevant sentencing enhancement applicable. See App. fig.A (showing over 
90% statutory causation ascription in cases of independent sufficiency, including where but-
for causation is absent).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 5–10.
242. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text.
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standards addressed in Gross. After all, it’s exceedingly rare that the evidence in 
motive-as-cause cases like Gross would rule out a finding of independent 
sufficiency. And more importantly, even in a case where independent sufficiency is 
somehow conclusively shown to be absent, there is no rule of lenity in a civil case 
like Gross (as opposed to a criminal case like Burrage) to save the defendant from 
liability where the clear majority interpretation would favor it (here, in response to 
the ADEA’s “because of” language, an approximately two-thirds supermajority).244
Perhaps needless to say, allowing for liability absent but-for causation in Gross and 
other similar statutory torts and civil rights contexts would have vast implications in 
both federal and state litigation.245
Stepping back, the experimental findings naturally raise the question: why, in 
these and similar statutory causation cases examined in Part I, have so many judges 
arrived at the “wrong” result (at least, wrong as assessed according to their own 
rhetoric)? We’ll examine a few possibilities below. But first, note that the question 
is why judges so often arrived at the “wrong” answer—not why, after arriving at it, 
they were so confident in its being obviously correct (indeed, so confident that they 
deemed the plain meaning rule applicable).246 As to that latter issue, the above results 
concerning overconfidence and consensus bias suggest that judges are doing exactly 
what most of us do—moving quickly from “x seems to me to be the ordinary 
meaning” to “x is obviously the ordinary meaning, as dictated by common sense and 
as understood by most people.”247 The oddity that calls out for explanation is why 
these judges landed on the but-for entailment thesis in the first place, not why they 
(like the rest of us) exhibited overconfidence and consensus bias with respect to their 
interpretive intuitions. So, why have so many judges arrived at the “wrong” result, 
and what might it tell us about interpretation more generally?
One set of possible explanations posits that legal training, perhaps along with 
related professional socialization and acculturation, leads lawyers and judges to think 
of causation in the sort of counterfactual terms that the but-for test encapsulates, even 
though laypeople do not.248 There are many ways this might happen. It could simply 
be that lawyers and judges are frequently exposed to but-for causation rules in law, 
and over time, through such repeated exposure, what initially felt like a more 
                                                                                                                
244. See App. fig.C. To be sure, in civil cases with particularly harsh potential penalties 
such as deportation, void-for-vagueness doctrine applies even though the rule of lenity does 
not. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
245. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 36, 43, 47.
246. On the plain meaning rule, see Baude & Doerfler, supra note 10, at 541.
247. See Solan et al., supra note 156.
248. To be clear, the claim need not be that counterfactual thinking doesn’t feature 
prominently, even centrally, in ordinary folk causal cognition. For example, independent 
sufficiency might play an important role in folk causality ascription precisely because it 
implicates a close possible world in which the focal cause was a but-for cause (namely, a world 
where the other, non-focal causes were absent). For discussion of various counterfactual-based 
models of causal cognition, see Adam Morris, Jonathan Phillips, Thomas Icard, Joshua Knobe, 
Tobias Gerstenberg & Fiery Cushman, Judgments of Actual Causation Approximate the 
Effectiveness of Interventions (July 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) on file with the 
Indiana Law Journal), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326139192_Judgments
_of_actual_causation_approximate_the_effectiveness_of_interventions [perma.cc/8XYL
-FDGT].
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specialized legal usage begins to feel like the commonsense, ordinary meaning of the 
term or concept.249 Another variation on the legal training and acculturation theme 
posits a deeper change in the lawyer or judge’s moral psychology compared with that 
of the average layperson: perhaps lawyers and judges internalize the conceptions of 
(corrective) justice and (limited) responsibility that many of our legal rules and 
litigation processes instantiate.250 Having internalized those deeper values, lawyers’ 
and judges’ notions of causation and causal responsibility come to reflect them in 
much the same way that the legal system itself does. Much more could be said on 
these and similar points, but regardless of whether one prefers a more surface-level 
explanation about semantic drift or instead a deeper one about drift in values and 
moral psychology, the basic practical thrust of this first set of explanations remains 
the same: legally trained interpreters have a somewhat idiosyncratic understanding 
of causation.
Another set of explanations—with more direct implications for statutory 
interpretation beyond questions of causation—concerns the influence that traditional 
extratextual sources of statutory meaning might exert over ordinary and plain 
meaning determinations, judicial rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding. These 
extratextual sources might include considerations of congressional intent or statutory 
purpose, as well as prior cases construing the same or similar statutory terms on 
grounds other than ordinary meaning.251 If these sorts of sources and considerations 
heavily influence judges’ ordinary meaning determinations, then one important 
practical upshot is that judges ought to be much more hesitant to import ordinary 
meaning determinations into new substantive and procedural contexts.252 In any 
event, if this second set of explanations is correct, then the more general takeaway is 
that ordinary and plain meaning determinations reflect neither more nor less than all-
sources-considered conclusions regarding statutory meaning. 
A final set of explanations focuses not on the influence of traditional extratextual 
sources of meaning, but instead on the influence of judges’ substantive preferences 
concerning case outcomes.253 Perhaps judges’ ordinary meaning determinations are 
skewed toward their own preferred outcomes, and many judges happen to prefer the 
outcomes that a but-for causation rule generates over the outcomes that equally clear 
                                                                                                                
249. As we saw in Section I.B.2, though, the but-for test is far from the only causation test 
at work in legal doctrine. Relatedly, therefore, one cannot easily explain the case outcomes in 
cases like Gross and Burrage by claiming that (1) the Justices were seeking a legal, rather than 
ordinary, meaning of causation, and (2) the “legal meaning” of causation just is but-for 
causation. On the contrary, even if (contra Justices’ and other judges’ indications in those and 
other statutory causation cases, see supra note 10) one were to assume that (1) is true, (2) 
would still be false (or at the very least, (2) would still have been false at the time those 
decisions were written). See Section I.B.2; see also Verstein; supra note 30; Andrew Verstein, 
The Failure of Mixed Motives Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3204012 [https://perma.cc/84VA
-EQLA]).
250. Cf. Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual 
Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181 (2003).
251. See Adam M. Samaha, If the Text Is Clear—Lexical Ordering in Statutory 
Interpretation, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155 (2018).
252. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
253. See Farnsworth et al., Policy Preferences and Legal Interpretation, supra note 150.
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and administrable rules like the “contributing factor” test generate. Why might these 
judges prefer the but-for rule? Return once again to Burrage and Gross as 
representative examples. In a criminal case like Burrage, the same sorts of fairness 
concerns undergirding the rule of lenity might lead judges to favor the more 
restrictive but-for rule. This preference then bleeds into their ordinary meaning 
determination even as they purport not to apply the rule of lenity—an example of a 
more general psychological phenomenon that might be called “motivated excusing” 
(in contrast to the oft-noted “motivated blaming” phenomenon addressed earlier).254
A similar sort of “motivated excusing” might likewise be at work in statutory tort 
cases like Gross where liability carries a similar message of moral disapprobation. In 
any event, while the present point is not to canvass all the available outcome-
preference-based accounts that one could propose, it is worth noting that such 
explanations at least hold out the possibility of explaining why judges (most 
prominently majority and dissenting Supreme Court Justices) have so often 
disagreed about the ordinary meaning of statutory causation language, and have done 
so in ways that map onto traditional ideological lines.255 The prior sets of 
explanations (focusing on legal training, and on exposure to extra-textual evidence) 
likely lack the resources to explain that disagreement. 
Having surveyed possible explanations for why courts have gotten ordinary and 
plain meaning wrong, what normative lessons might we draw concerning statutory 
interpretation methodology more generally? There are once again many possibilities, 
and I suspect that one’s normative takeaway depends at least in part on which of the 
above descriptive accounts one finds more convincing. Still, two broad possibilities 
stand out. One lesson might simply be that when courts and commentators pontificate 
about ordinary meaning, they should do so more cautiously and accurately, perhaps 
drawing on experimental evidence similar to this Article’s. A second possible 
reaction, however, goes further: perhaps now that we’ve seen that courts may be 
prone to get ordinary and plain meaning wrong, we should prefer that courts give 
less weight to their ordinary meaning determinations than they currently purport to, 
and should give more weight to alternative sources or types of meaning (e.g., 
nonordinary “legal” meaning found in precedent, congressional intent found in 
legislative history, etc.). 
More would need to be said, and more empirical evidence marshaled, before 
deeming that second reaction warranted. For example, this Article does not speak to 
the relative merits of other methods of interpretation or sources of statutory meaning, 
                                                                                                                
254. See supra note 227 and accompanying text; John Turri & Peter Blouw, Excuse 
Validation: A Study in Rule-Breaking, 172 PHILOS. STUD. 615, 615 (2014) (demonstrating that 
people sometimes claim that a given rule was not broken if they consider it to have been 
blamelessly broken).
255. This is true not only of the Supreme Court decisions discussed in Part I, but also many 
of the more ideologically charged state and lower federal court decisions noted there. See 
supra note 72 (discussing conflicting causation determinations in cases where multiple police 
officers simultaneously injure a victim and each officer’s use of force was independently 
sufficient to bring about the victim’s injury); supra note 103 (discussing conflicting causation 
determinations in cases where discrimination plaintiffs allege that the defendant possessed 
multiple unlawful motives, each of which was independently sufficient to motivate the 
defendant’s discriminatory act). 
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especially outside criminal and tort law. Nor does this Article’s initial study of 
causation show how often courts are mistaken about ordinary meaning. The Article’s 
more modest lesson is that, to the extent that we rely on claims about public 
meaning—as we must and should do at least to some extent in criminal and tort 
settings—we ought to seriously consider asking the public; and where we are unable 
or unwilling to do so, we ought to treat such claims with caution and skepticism, 
recognizing that they are often both consequential and falsifiable.
V. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This Part argues that similar methods to those used in Part IV could shed light on 
further areas of dispute in law and legal theory. Section V.A considers further uses 
of survey experiments in legal interpretation; Section V.B considers how the 
methodology may help explain and predict the development of common law 
doctrine; and Section V.C returns to causation in criminal and tort theory to see where 
the methodology fits within traditional philosophical analyses of legal concepts.
A. Legal Interpretation Beyond Statutory Causation and Plain Meaning
Until now, the focus has been on how surveys and experiments might inform 
judges interpreting statutory causation language (and assessing jury instructions 
based on those statutory terms). One could imagine using a similar experimental 
methodology in additional contexts—assessing statutory terms outside the criminal 
and tort context, for example, or analyzing common law terms created and used by 
judges in nonstatutory contexts (as well as jury instructions based on them).256 And 
the experimental method need not be limited to ascertaining the meaning of discrete 
terms and concepts. For example, surveys could test linguistic canons of 
interpretation to see whether they track common linguistic intuitions.257 Judges could 
then demote or discard those linguistic canons that fail to reflect ordinary language 
use258—a practice that might please the many judges and commentators who lament 
                                                                                                                
256. In other words, experiments may illuminate nonstatutory contexts where we are 
interpreting what a judge’s words (rather than a legislature’s words) meant or will be 
interpreted to mean in future judicial opinions. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 686 (1986). The point is also, and more directly, applicable to jurors’ 
interpretations of judges’ words, where, as often happens, jury instructions parrot the exact 
language of appellate opinions that set out the relevant standard. See, e.g., Boyle v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 938, 942 (2009).
257. Linguistic canons, after all, are “guesses about the way actual people actually speak.” 
Baude & Sachs, supra note 10, at 1088; Gluck & Bressman, supra note 117, at 925 (collecting 
sources). If they fail to track ordinary language use, they might lack justification. See SLOCUM,
supra note 10; Baude & Sachs, supra note 10, at 1126; Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2159–
60; Sevilla, supra note 15.
258. See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2159–60 (“[W]e ought to shed semantic 
canons” that fail to accurately “reflect the meaning that people, including Members of 
Congress, ordinarily intend to communicate with their choice of words.” (citing Elena Kagan, 
The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARVARD LAW 
TODAY, at 35:42 (Nov. 17, 2015) (semantic canons are “just ways of formalizing . . . correct
intuitions[] about how people use language” (emphasis added)), http://today.law.harvard.edu
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the proliferation of conflicting canons, which, due to the possibility of “canon 
shopping,” fail to constrain judges or to render judicial interpretation more 
predictable.259
Experiments might also be useful where a legal provision’s ordinary or plain 
meaning is for practical purposes undisputed, but its degree of vagueness or 
ambiguity is disputed, as often happens especially in criminal law, but also in some 
statutory and constitutional tort contexts.260 For example, with the benefit of 
experimental evidence, courts might more clearly articulate the relevant triggers for 
applying doctrines like void-for-vagueness,261 lenity,262 and mistake-of-law defenses 
in criminal263 and noncriminal law,264 as well as the standards for what counts as 
“clearly established law” for purposes of qualified immunity.265 The implications of 
these experiments need not be as rigid as some might fear: ambiguity or vagueness 
triggers could be ranges, rather than fixed percentages, and those ranges could shift 
according to the stakes of the interpretive dispute (e.g., in the lenity context, greater 
clarity needed for greater punishment) or the policy considerations underlying the 
interpretive rule (e.g., in the void-for-vagueness context, greater clarity needed where 
there is greater risk of discriminatory enforcement).266 And in certain contexts, 
surveys could be administered to groups of specialists, instead of or in addition to 
laypeople.267 In any event, experimental data would go some way toward promoting 
                                                                                                                
/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/4899-7ARR])).
259. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950).
260. On the common designation of tort suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as 
“constitutional” torts as opposed to “statutory” torts, see Levin & Wells, supra note 69, at 2, 
13.
261. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2018) (“The void-for-vagueness 
doctrine, as we have called it, guarantees that ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct 
a statute proscribes.”); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[T]he void-for-
vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited . . . .”).
262. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 117, at 947. 
263. See McAdams, supra note 129, at 32.
264. See Kenneth W. Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law, Noncriminal Law, 
and Fact, 9 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2012).
265. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62 (2016); see also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) 
(discussing the greater amount of notice required to constitute “fair notice” as applied to police 
officer defendants as opposed to the general public).
266. Cf. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137 (2016).
267. For example, in a dispute over the doctrine of lenity’s application to a technical 
securities fraud provision, a survey might show how securities traders most naturally interpret 
the statute’s words. Cf. Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 15 (discussing surveys of 
specialized members of trades to determine trade usage in contract interpretation).
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more coherent and consistent application of these doctrines, in line with scholarly 
proposals,268 even if that survey data is not treated as dispositive.269
One final possible extension concerns state and federal constitutional 
interpretation.270 The idea most naturally applies where modern-day courts and 
philosophers already analyze a given term or concept found in the constitution 
according to what they claim modern-day usage entails. Consider, for example, the 
word “punishment” in the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.271 Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, as well as Judge Posner, have endorsed the claim that the 
ordinary concept of “punishment”—“whether we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, 
or 1985”—entails an intent to punish.272 In other words, there is no such thing as 
unintentional “punishment”273—a conceptual and linguistic claim with real 
consequences for prisoners bringing negligence-based civil rights suits, for 
                                                                                                                
268. See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 266; see also Kavanaugh, supra note 110, at 2142–43 
(contending that “too much of current statutory interpretation revolves around personally 
instinctive assessments of clarity versus ambiguity . . . . And even if judges could make 
threshold findings of ambiguity in a neutral way, they still would have trouble convincing the 
public that they were acting impartially. It is all but impossible to communicate clarity versus 
ambiguity determinations in a reasoned and accountable way . . . . This kind of decisionmaking 
threatens to undermine the stability of the law and the neutrality (actual and perceived) of the 
judiciary.”).
269. Relatedly, though less tied to criminal and tort law, experimental evidence might aid 
courts in deciding whether to adopt a “saving construction” that avoids rendering a statute 
unconstitutional. That is, experimental evidence might assist judges by showing more 
precisely the degree to which a given saving construction would be “nonordinary” or 
“unnatural” (an issue that often divides judges disagreeing over whether to adopt a given 
saving construction). See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1997).
270. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2007) (“[T]he 
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” (quoting United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))); cf. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? 
Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594, 1609, 1621 (2005); Todd E. Pettys, Popular 
Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 313, 321, 354 (2008).
271. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
272. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300–02 (1991) (“An intent requirement is either 
implicit in the word ‘punishment’ or is not; it cannot be alternately required and ignored as 
policy considerations might dictate.” (quoting approvingly Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 
645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he accepted meaning of the word, whether we 
consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985 . . . [t]his is what the word means today; it is what 
it meant in the eighteenth century.”))); accord Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Raff Donelson, Cruel and Unusual What? Toward a Unified 
Definition of Punishment, 9 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1 (2016). Many philosophers of law have 
likewise purported to provide philosophical analyses of the concept of legal punishment, often 
claiming that their accounts track the folk concept and usage, but failing to cite empirical 
support beyond their own individual intuitions. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the 
Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1–27 (1968); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 227 (2007); Steven Sverdlik, Punishment, 7 
LAW & PHIL. 179, 190 (1988); DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT ch. 1 (2008).
273. But see Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012).
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example.274 In support of this claim, these judges cite modern dictionaries,275
Founding Era dictionaries,276 and intuition pumps that they themselves have created 
based on their experience with the concept in ordinary discourse.277 Here, then, is 
another area where judges and philosophers make competing assertions about a 
concept, purporting to track lay usage and intuitions, relying on their own intuitions 
to guide them. It is thus another area where experiments might provide additional 
relevant evidence of ordinary, public meaning—at least, that is, to the extent that we 
either (a) care about current public meaning per se,278 or, perhaps more likely, (b) 
care about public meaning at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, but agree 
with these judges and philosophers that the folk concept and ordinary usage of 
“punishment” has probably not shifted in the relevant respect since then.279 Again, 
such limited inquiries need not open the floodgates to popular or populist 
constitutional interpretation writ large.280
B. Predicting the Common Law: Legal Realism, the New Doctrinalism, and 
Experimental Jurisprudence
The prior subsection considered how judges ought to determine the ordinary
meaning of terms or concepts (or at least their degree of vagueness or ambiguity) 
where judges already expressly state that they find ordinary usage relevant. 
American Legal Realists famously sought to explain and predict judicial decision-
making through whatever factors or considerations—whether stated or unstated—
actually turn out to have the greatest predictive or explanatory power. In their wake, 
economists, philosophers, and political scientists have taken up this descriptive 
project with varying degrees of success, explaining judicial decision-making and the 
evolution of common law doctrine using notions of economic efficiency, theories of 
justice, ideological preferences, and so forth. 
Recently, a movement dubbed the New Doctrinalism has emerged, emphasizing 
the ways in which law’s doctrinal categories really do channel judges’ intuitions and 
reasoning, forcing judges to conceptualize legal disputes in categories like 
“reasonableness” (and “causation”)—influencing and constraining legal decision-
making to a degree and in a manner distinct from that which a pure economic or 
                                                                                                                
274. See Donelson, supra note 272, at 35–36.
275. E.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300–02; Helling, 509 U.S. at 40 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
276. E.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300–02; Helling, 509 U.S. at 38.
277. E.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (quoting Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 652); Helling, 509 U.S. 
at 38. Occasionally, they even cite ordinary language philosophers. See, e.g., Does #1-5 v. 
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir. 2016) (considering whether the federal Sex Offender 
Registration Act’s restrictions “meet the general, and widely accepted, definition of 
punishment offered by legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart”).
278. See Solum, supra note 197, at 62–65 (2015) (discussing “the ‘Contemporary Readers’ 
Meaning Theory” of constitutional interpretation).
279. See supra notes 271–77; Solum, supra note 197, at 19, 42–50, 57, 73–75 (discussing 
the concept of “cruelty” in the context of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual” punishments, along with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding evolving 
conceptions of cruelty for Eighth Amendment purposes).
280. See sources cited supra notes 272, 277.
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positive political science model, for instance, would consider.281 The “‘law and’ 
movement,” some New Doctrinalists suggest, has become too unmoored from how 
judges, reasoning from the law’s internal point of view, actually decide cases.282 To 
invoke a phrase popular among the early American Legal Realists: judges’ “situation 
sense”283 upon learning the basic facts and issues in a case is filtered through the 
basic conceptual categories judges take themselves to be bound to apply.284 A
realistic positive (as opposed to normative) account of adjudication, the New 
Doctrinalists usefully remind us, must take account not only of judges’ pre-legal 
“situation sense” but also legal doctrine.
The positive parts of the Legal Realist and New Doctrinalist research programs 
stand in need of another, complimentary (and of course, capitalized) movement: 
Experimental Jurisprudence285—the examination, through controlled experiment, of 
ordinary concepts, language, and intuitions, combined with analysis of their 
explanatory role in predicting legal outcomes.286 At this point, though, the New 
                                                                                                                
281. See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside Out, 126 YALE L.J. 1320, 1335–36
(2017) (summarizing New Doctrinalism and collecting sources); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
The Constraint of Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2015); see also Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and American Legal
Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2426 (2014). To be clear, most American Legal Realists did not 
deny that doctrine plays an important role in judicial decision-making, especially in easy cases 
(where it may fully determine the result), and especially where legal doctrine has been 
reformed to more accurately reflect the (previously nonlegal) norms that the Realists believed 
drove judicial decision-making sub silencio at the time the Realists were writing. See Brian 
Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1983 (2015).
282. See Tilley, supra note 281, at 1336.
283. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 59–61, 
121–57, 206–08 (1960); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of 
the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929); Dan M. Kahan, David 
Hoffman, Danieli Evans, Neal Devins, Eugene Lucci & Katherine Cheng, “Ideology” or 
“Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional 
Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016).
284. See Balganesh, supra note 281, at 1857. To be clear, American Legal Realists 
maintained that judges’ “situation sense” was a function of nonlegal norms, not legal doctrine 
(at least as the doctrine existed at the time they were writing). See Brian Leiter, Rethinking 
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 277 (1997); Leiter, 
supra note 281, at 1975. For more precise, albeit differing, accounts of judicial “situation 
sense” as the notion figured in the thinking of various American Realists, see Kahan et al., 
supra note 283, at 373 (adopting Karl Llewellyn’s later characterization of situation sense as 
a “perceptive faculty”); Leiter, supra, at 277 (criticizing this view as “cryptic” and not in 
keeping with other Realists’ more “naturalistically respectable” accounts of judicial “situation 
sense”).     
285. The label is taken from Solum, supra note 281, at 2464–65 (noting “the nascent 
emergence of experimental jurisprudence (or ‘X-Jur’),” and explaining that the label “is 
modeled on the analogous phrase ‘experimental philosophy’” (citing EXPERIMENTAL 
PHILOSOPHY (Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, eds., 2008))).
286. The normative projects contained in of each of these schools of thought would 
likewise benefit from Experimental Jurisprudence: whether one views folk concepts and 
ordinary usage as things to be embraced or instead to be manipulated and overcome,
implementation of one’s preferred normative theory requires understanding the ordinary 
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Doctrinalist might wonder: Why “ordinary” concepts, rather than “legal” concepts? 
Why “ordinary” usage and “ordinary” intuitions rather than lawyers’ and judges’ 
usage and intuitions? After all, judges exercise significant discretion in giving terms 
and concepts a legal meaning that diverges from ordinary meaning.287 Indeed, at 
their most extreme, concepts seemingly familiar to the layperson can become so 
infused with legal policy considerations that they become nearly unrecognizable in 
their application (does a “reasonable” person really do x? How can someone not have 
a “duty” to do y? Etc.). 
The answer is multifaceted, but we have already seen many of the facets. The very 
doctrinal rules that judges internalize instruct them to consider ordinary usage, 
concepts, and intuitions.288 Procedural rules further require them to consider what a 
reasonable jury could conclude regarding a given concept, including many 
normatively infused concepts like “reasonableness,” “substantiality,” “knowledge,” 
“intent,” and “causation.”289 And indeed, judges say that they consult and rely on 
ordinary usage, concepts, and intuitions, often justifying that reliance not only 
through recourse to positive legal sources (other judicial decisions and procedural 
rules) that direct them to do so, but also by direct recourse to the various underlying 
values, examined in Part II, undergirding reliance on ordinary meaning and common 
understanding in the first place. Across the mine-run of cases and doctrines, through 
the workaday rulings of the many overburdened judges throughout state and federal 
court systems, in the vast majority of cases in which they have no particular 
preference for a given outcome, common law concepts remain tethered to their 
ordinary meanings and to the folk concepts they originally embodied.290 Judges, in 
short, apply common law concepts on ordinary meaning’s leash.291
By better understanding how most people interpret and apply a given word or 
concept, we may therefore be able to more accurately predict and explain how judges 
will interpret and apply it. Scaling up, we may be able to better predict and explain 
the development of common law doctrine over time. And this may be true even if, in 
some contexts, judges do not explicitly say that they are relying on ordinary usage or 
folk concepts. As virtually everybody acknowledges, judges, even in common law 
                                                                                                                
concepts and linguistic usage that the actual decisionmakers—judges and juries—bring to the 
task. See infra note 289 (noting normative efficiency theories of causation-in-fact).
287. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in the 
Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (2015).
288. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
289. On normativity and notions of “substantiality,” as well as mental states like 
knowledge and intent, see Macleod, supra note 164; cf. Markus Kneer & Sacha Bourgeois-
Gironde, Mens Rea Ascription, Expertise and Outcome Effects: Professional Judges Surveyed,
169 COGNITION 139 (2017). On reasonableness and normativity, see Kevin P. Tobia, How 
People Judge What Is Reasonable, 70 ALA. L. REV. 293 (2018); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 PA. L. REV. 2131 (2015). 
290. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble With Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 67, 107 (2010). But see Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law 
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV.
287 (2007).
291. Indeed, where they start to drift especially far from their ordinary meanings, 
commentators and other judges often for that very reason cry foul. See Balganesh & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 287.
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contexts, and even at their most creative, daring, and instrumentalist, are loath to give 
words a “meaning they cannot bear.”292 What they can bear typically depends on the 
ordinary meaning and the plausible extension of folk concepts—something 
experiments can help ascertain.
C. Experimental Philosophy of Criminal and Tort Law: Causation as a Case Study
Let’s return more squarely to causation, using it now as a case study in methods 
of conceptual analysis in philosophy of criminal and tort law. We’ve seen that Hart 
and Honoré set out to analyze “commonsense” notions of causation at work in the 
law, explicitly relying on ordinary language and intuitions as their guide.293 But while 
their analysis remains influential, it has also often been criticized for its reliance on 
arguments from ordinary language and intuitions. This criticism is exemplified in the 
work of Michael Moore, the most prominent philosopher of causation in criminal 
and tort law since Hart and Honoré. It is worth briefly considering Moore’s 
alternative approach to analyzing causation in the law and the methodological 
obstacles it runs into—obstacles that, like Hart and Honoré’s work from decades 
prior, highlight the need for experimental philosophy of law.
Moore’s goal is to provide a “metaphysically robust” account of “the nature of 
causation”—to find what causation “actually is,” which, on his view, means finding 
a natural thing or relation that exists out there in the world independently of how 
people talk and think about it.294 He sees the goal of his project as being much like a 
natural scientist’s in revealing that, say, what we long ago decided to call “water” 
actually is H2O.295 (But why ought legal theorists to be concerned with the 
“metaphysically robust” notion of causation, rather than simply the “commonsense”
one that Hart and Honoré thought was at work in the law? Because, on Moore’s 
                                                                                                                
292. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 109–11, 134 (1977). One 
prominent example of such a daring account in the causation literature is Steven Shavell’s 
“probabilistic cause” account. See Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of 
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980); see also Richard W. Wright, Actual 
Causation vs. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 
(1985); Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causation and Responsibility: 
Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553 (1987); Richard W. 
Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J. TORT LAW 65 (2015).
293. See supra notes 23, 137–43 and accompanying text.
294. Moore is a metaphysical realist about causation (and, as relevant here, about morality 
and about semantic reference). Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2424, 2437 (1992); MOORE, supra note 23, at 255–60; Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of 
Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981). In other words, Moore believes the following about 
judgments of causation, judgments of morality, and judgments about what words like “cause” 
actually refer to: such judgments are all apt for evaluation in terms of truth or falsity; at least 
some such judgments are true; and, importantly, such judgments’ truth or falsity is entirely 
independent of whether they seem to any observer (including an ideal and unbiased one) to be 
true or false. For further background and critical discussion of Moore’s metaphysical realism, 
see Brian Bix, Michael Moore’s Realist Approach to Law, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 1293 (1992).
295. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 146, at 854–55.
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account, the notion of causation that both is and should be at work in criminal law,296
tort law,297 and even in correct interpretation of statutory causation language outside 
these substantive contexts,298 is whatever that metaphysically accurate notion of 
causation turns out to be—even if it turns out to differ from our “commonsense” 
notion of causation.)
So, Moore is looking for what causation “actually is,” not just what our ordinary
usage and intuitions would have us think it is. And according to Moore, those two 
things—metaphysically accurate causation and commonsense causation—could be 
“considerably different.”299 In short, Hart and Honoré’s “sociology”300 does not show 
us the underlying metaphysical reality that, whatever it turns out to be, is at work in 
the law.301 What, then, would show us that underlying metaphysical reality? How, in 
other words, does Moore find out what causation “actually is” as a matter of 
metaphysics (and hence, what it “actually is” for purposes of assigning moral 
responsibility, determining liability in criminal and tort law, and interpreting what 
statutory causation language references)? How does he proceed without relying 
primarily on appeals to the sort of data—ordinary linguistic, conceptual, and moral 
intuitions—from which Hart and Honoré derived their account? 
As others have pointed out, Moore doesn’t: he in fact relies extensively on appeals 
to ordinary language and intuitions throughout his work on causation, sometimes as
decisive evidence in favor of or against a given position.302 (Though to be sure, 
                                                                                                                
296. MOORE, supra note 23, at 8.
297. Id.; see also, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Semantics, Metaphysics, and Objectivity in the 
Law, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 146 (Geert Keil & 
Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (judges must “not look to policies in deciding on tort and criminal 
liability. Rather, they must apply the best metaphysics of the causal relation, as best they can 
ascertain it. That, of course, is a formidable task. Fortunately there are good books to help 
them.”).
298. In Moore’s view, “causation” is a natural kind, like “gold” or “water,” and when the 
legislature uses natural kind terms, it invokes whatever the metaphysically accurate account 
of that concept turns out to be. The basis for this latter assumption is a little unclear, though 
Moore at times appeals to speaker intent and rule of law reasons. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 
123, at 291, 341; Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, A Planet by Any Other Name . . ., 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1011, 1026 (2010); LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 26, at 268–69.
299. Moore, supra note 146, at 855.
300. E.g., id. at 853–54, 868; MOORE, supra note 23.
301. E.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 255–60; Moore, supra note 23, at 854–55. 
302. E.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 29–33, 38–39, 55–58, 66, 362, 438, 443, 445–47, 462, 
507; see also Richard W. Wright, Causation: Metaphysics or Intuition?, in LEGAL, MORAL,
AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 171 (Ferzan & Morse 
eds., 2015) (“Although he purports to disavow Hart and Honoré’s reliance on ordinary 
language usage as an indicator of actual causal relations, his frequent and often heavy reliance 
on supposed common intuitions to support his arguments belies that disavowal”); Stapleton, 
Choosing What We Mean, supra note 141, at 465; Roger Shiner, Causation, Responsibility, 
and Metaphysics, 31 LAW & PHIL. 601, 613 (2012). Wright, for his part, similarly disavows 
ordinary usage and intuition while appealing to it at times (though, to be sure, rarely for such 
crucial points in his argument as those for which Moore appeals to them). See, e.g., Wright, 
Causation in Tort Law, supra note 81, at 1788–803; Wright, supra note 138, at 165; Richard 
Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the 
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1003, 1009 (1988); Wright, 
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Moore does not hesitate in reaching a number of conclusions that go against other 
philosophers’,303 courts’,304 and laypeoples’305 intuitions.306) In the end, then,
Moore’s “‘I know it when I see it’ primitivist”307 account of causation, whatever its 
metaphysical ambitions,308 is derived largely from data strikingly similar to that on 
                                                                                                                
Legal Responsibility, supra note 81, at 1441; see also Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean,
supra note 141, at 472; Sara Bernstein, Intuitions and the Metaphysics of Causation, in
EXPERIMENTAL METAPHYSICS 75, (David Rose ed., 2017) (“Should intuitions play a role in a 
theory of causation? Metaphysicians often bristle at the idea, while at the same time utilizing 
intuitions. . . . [M]ost metaphysical and causal theorizing centrally involves intuitions.”).
303. Compare, e.g., MOORE, supra note 23, at 116–17 (regarding the impossibility of 
omissions as causes), with Jonathan Schaffer, Disconnection and Responsibility, 18 LEGAL 
THEORY 399 (2012) and Paul Henne et al., Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering 
Plants, 95 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. (2017); see also MOORE, supra note 23, at 414–18
(discussing David Lewis’s intuitions concerning causality in certain types of 
overdetermination cases, and conceding that Lewis’s intuitions are “tempting,” but concluding 
that “the California Supreme Court’s causal intuitions in this actual case seem persuasive 
here,” and then “buttress[ing] this otherwise rather naked intuition by likening these cases to” 
other cases that come to similar results); see also, e.g., Wright & Puppe, supra note 71, at 476 
(discussing various philosophers’ contrary intuitions concerning multiple contributors); 
RICHARD W. WRIGHT, THE NESS ACCOUNT OF NATURAL CAUSATION: A RESPONSE TO 
CRITICISMS 12 (same), https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1715
&context=fac_schol. Moore raises similar concerns about the counterintuitive implications of 
Wright’s account of causation, implying that incompatibility with common intuitions is, in his 
own view, to be avoided where possible in generating a correct theory of causation. See, e.g.,
MOORE, supra note 23, at 489; see also Wright & Puppe, supra note 71, at 501–02.  
304. Moore is open about treating case law as at times only a relatively minor constraint, 
since “[t]he law has mixed too many extraneous elements into what it calls ‘causation’ for 
there to be much hope for any metaphysical translation.” See Jane Stapleton, Causation in the 
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION 761 (Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, 
and Peter Menzies eds., 2009) (criticizing this move on Moore’s part); see also note 160, supra
(comparing Moore’s intuitions with the Burrage Court’s); cf. MOORE, supra note 23, at 115 
(criticizing as ad hoc Wright’s explanations for case outcomes seemingly contrary to Wright’s 
account of causation). 
305. See, e.g., Schaffer, supra note 303; Henne et al., supra note 303.
306. These aspects of Moore’s theory might be more easily overlooked if his account were 
aimed at generating a test for causation that judges or jurors could use, but that is neither an 
aim nor a result of Moore’s staunchly metaphysical project. See MOORE, supra note 23, at xi. 
Wright’s formalization of Hart and Honoré’s test for factual causation is likewise widely 
acknowledged to be too complicated to be applied by juries. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 79,
at 1762 (calling Wright’s test “far too complex to be of any real utility to lay fact finders.”); 
Johnson, supra note 80, at 102 (same). Wright’s aim, like Moore’s, is not, or at least not 
primarily, to provide a usable test; it is to provide an accurate analysis of “the basic concept 
of causation, which we all intuitively employ.” Wright, supra note 81, at 1441; see also 
Wright, supra note 81, at 1802 (claiming that his “necessary element of a sufficient set” 
analysis of causation “is not just a test for causation, but is itself the meaning of causation”). 
307. Wright, Causation: Metaphysics or Intuition?, supra note 302, at 171; see MOORE,
supra note 23, at 506 (calling himself a “reluctant primitivist” about the nature of causation); 
Richard Fumerton & Ken Kress, Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency, and 
Causal Sufficiency, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83 (2001).
308. See Schaffer, supra note 303, at 400.
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which Hart and Honoré relied: armchair speculation about intuitive responses to 
cases.309
An alternative approach to understanding causation in criminal and tort law is to 
return to something like Hart and Honoré’s project,310 but with greater empirical 
rigor.311 Hart and Honoré, after all, had a sample size of two: Hart and Honoré. An 
alternative approach, in other words, is to do experimental philosophy of law312—to 
“demand,” in Brian Leiter’s words, “that any account of those features of law which 
depends on ‘folk intuitions’ as data points in theory-construction ought to answer to 
empirically sound methods for ascertaining that data. . . . [T]his kind of ‘experimental 
philosophy’ is likely to set much of the agenda for naturalistic legal philosophy at 
the dawn of the 21st century.”313
CONCLUSION
There is much to be said for ordinary meaning interpretation, at least in many 
criminal and torts contexts. As one scholar recently put it, “[o]rdinary meaning 
requires the interpreter to put herself in the shoes of a nonlegal audience; it has a 
built-in form of impartiality, not to mention democratic appeal.”314 Yet if ordinary 
meaning is premised on little more than judges’ intuitions and biased guesswork 
about “common sense,” the method loses much of its claim to impartiality. Likewise, 
the method loses its “democratic appeal” if it allows judicial ipse dixit to replace 
reasoned analysis, and judicial preferences to replace popular ones. Heavy reliance 
on untested intuitions about ordinary and plain meaning can (perhaps ironically) 
render statutory interpretation decisions mystifying and misleading to legally trained 
and lay audiences alike.
Judges, legal philosophers, and the rest of us can be mistaken about whether our 
own intuitions match the general public’s “common understanding.” In light of the 
empirical data reported in this Article, courts’ recent statutory causation decisions 
appear to present a stark and consequential example of just such a mismatch. By 
increasing the sample size—by asking the general public itself—judges, 
philosophers, and the rest of us can more accurately, and more impartially, find 
ordinary meaning and common understanding in statutory interpretation and beyond. 
At the very least, by asking from time to time, we can be reminded of the risk we run 
in failing to do so, and of the skepticism with which we should approach untested 
                                                                                                                
309. Cf. Fumerton & Kress, supra note 307, at 83.
310. See Ian P. Farrell, H.L.A. Hart and the Methodology of Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 983 (2006); see also LUCY, supra note 141, at 184.
311. See, e.g., Stapleton, supra note 304, at 759 (“Hart and Honoré's linguistic ‘analysis’ 
was not based on a rigorous empirical survey . . . patterns of usage were merely asserted and 
illustrated.”); Stapleton, Unpacking Causation, supra note 141, at 148–55; David Howarth, O
Madness of Discourse, That Cause Sets Up With and Against Itself!, 96 YALE L.J. 1389, 1402–
04 (1987); LUCY, supra note 141, at 200. 
312. For an introduction and overview of the field of experimental philosophy, see Knobe 
& Nichols, supra note 285.
313. LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 26, at 4; Leiter, Three 
Approaches, supra note 26, at 9.
314. Nourse, supra note 10, at 1004.
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but in principle (and often in practice) falsifiable claims concerning common sense 
and ordinary understanding.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix contains the text of each vignette followed by a Figure showing 
statutory, but-for, and substantial factor causation ascription in response to the 
vignette in each of its four necessity/sufficiency conditions.315
DRUG OVERDOSE (Burrage): 
For vignette text, see supra pages 996 to 997.
Figure A. Drug Overdose (Burrage): Statutory, But-For, and Substantial Factor 
Causation Ascription (N = 508)
                                                                                                                
315. Figures A through D (unlike Figure 2 supra) omit the “contributing factor” and “sole” 
cause questions. This is simply for ease of visualization, given that those two tests are the least 
important to this article’s analysis. 
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HATE CRIME (Miller316):
Sam worked at a financial company. Sam couldn’t stand his new co-worker, 
Harry, because Harry was a member of a religion that Sam hated, and because Harry 
got a higher salary than Sam despite being new at the company.
After a few weeks of simmering hatred, Sam decided to attack Harry. So one 
evening, while Harry was walking home from work, Sam, wearing a ski mask to 
disguise his identity, ran up to Harry and punched him in the face several times, 
causing very serious injuries, and then ran off.
Later that night, Sam’s best friend, Joe, came to Sam’s apartment to talk to 
him. Sam and Joe were always totally honest with each other. Sam told Joe that he 
had just attacked Harry. Joe asked Sam why he did it, and Sam told him about how 
he hated Harry’s religion and how he hated that Harry got a higher salary than him.
Joe wanted to know more about Sam’s motivations for attacking Harry, so he 
asked Sam a few more questions. Sam was completely honest with him. Sam 
explained that he…
                                                                                                                
316. This vignette is based in part on Miller and in part on the facts of United States v. Hill, 
182 F. Supp. 3d 546, 555 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“[I]f the conduct underlying a[n HCPA] 
prosecution has any sort of commercial motivation—if, for example, Hill had punched C.T. 
because of both C.T.'s sexual orientation and C.T. having taken Hill's job as a packer—then 
the government could never obtain a conviction.” (citing United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 
585, 594 (2014))).
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Still, Sam explained, as it actually happened, both things motivated him to attack 
Harry. Joe knew Sam was telling the truth.
Figure B. Hate Crime (Miller): Statutory, But-For, and Substantial Factor 
Causation Ascription (N = 452) 
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (Gross):
Steve works as a manager at a large financial company. The company needs to 
downsize. Steve has never met Jack, one of the company’s employees. But Steve 
decided to fire Jack because Steve thinks employees Jack’s age aren’t capable of 
working hard, and because Jack’s position is no longer necessary. 
Last Tuesday, Steve fired Jack. Later that night, Steve’s best friend from business 
school, Robert, came to Steve’s apartment to talk to him. Steve and Robert were 
always totally honest with each other. Steve told Robert that he had fired 
Jack. Robert asked Steve why he did it, and Steve told him about how he thinks 
employees Jack’s age aren’t capable of working hard, and how Jack’s position is no 
longer necessary.
Robert wanted to know more about Steve’s motivations for firing Jack, so he 
asked Steve a few more questions. Steve was completely honest with him. Steve 
explained that he… 
[1] Necessary 
& Sufficient
[2] Necessary & 
Insufficient
[3] Unnecessary 
& Sufficient
[4] Unnecessary
& Insufficient
…still would 
have fired Jack 
even if he had 
only known 
Jack’s age (and 
hadn’t known 
that Jack’s 
position was 
unnecessary). 
And Steve 
explained that 
he would not 
have fired Jack 
if he had only 
known that 
Jack’s position 
was 
unnecessary 
(and hadn’t 
known Jack’s 
age).
…would not 
have fired Jack 
if he had only 
known Jack’s 
age (and hadn’t 
known that 
Jack’s position 
was 
unnecessary). 
And Steve 
explained that 
he would not 
have fired Jack 
if he had only 
known that 
Jack’s position 
was 
unnecessary 
(and hadn’t 
known Jack’s 
age).
…would have 
fired Jack even 
if he had only 
known Jack’s 
age (and hadn’t 
known that 
Jack’s position 
was 
unnecessary).
And Steve 
explained that 
he still would 
have fired Jack 
even if he had 
only known that 
Jack’s position 
was 
unnecessary 
(and hadn’t 
known Jack’s 
age).
…would not 
have fired Jack 
if he had only 
known Jack’s 
age (and hadn’t 
known that 
Jack’s position 
was 
unnecessary). 
And Steve
explained that 
he still would 
have fired Jack 
even if he had 
only known 
that Jack’s 
position was 
unnecessary 
(and hadn’t 
known Jack’s 
age).
Still, Steve explained, as it actually happened, both things motivated him to fire 
Jack. Robert knew Steve was telling the truth.
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Figure C. Employment Discrimination (Gross): Statutory, But-For, and Substantial 
Factor Causation Ascription (N = 450)
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PLANT FOOD (Low-Blame Version of Burrage):
Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen are plant foods. A typical dose of each helps 
houseplants grow. But unusually potent doses are very harmful to houseplants, and 
can even kill them. Stores sell Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen in powder form, in 
small plastic bags. To use them, plant owners mix the powder into a glass of water 
and pour it into their plant’s soil. Used this way, Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen take 
a few hours to become absorbed into the plant.
On Tuesday morning, Josh went to three local stores to buy plant food. One sold 
Josh a packet of Fintene, another sold Josh a packet of Rextor, and the other sold 
Josh a packet of Tamphen. Josh wanted his houseplant to grow, so he decided that 
that afternoon, he would feed his plant all three of the foods together.
What Josh didn’t know was that the Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen he bought 
were all unusually potent. (The salesperson at each store had explained this to him, 
and had told him not to use an entire packet all at once, but he hadn't listened to what 
they were saying.) In fact,…
[1] Necessary 
& Sufficient
[2] Necessary & 
Insufficient
[3] Unnecessary 
& Sufficient
[4] Unnecessary 
& Insufficient
…although 
neither the 
Rextor by itself, 
nor the 
Tamphen by 
itself, nor the 
combination of 
Rextor and 
Tamphen 
together would 
have killed the 
plant, the 
Fintene by 
itself would 
have killed the 
plant. And…
…although 
neither the 
Fintene by itself 
nor the 
combination of 
the Rextor and 
Tamphen 
together would 
have killed the 
plant,…
…the Fintene 
by itself would 
have killed the 
plant, the 
Rextor by itself 
would have 
killed the plant, 
and the 
Tamphen by 
itself would 
have killed the 
plant. Any two 
of the three 
foods together 
would also have 
killed the plant. 
And…
…although 
neither the 
Fintene by 
itself, nor the 
Rextor by itself, 
nor the 
Tamphen by 
itself would 
have killed the 
plant, any two 
of the three 
foods together 
would have 
killed the 
plant. And…
[A]ll three foods together would kill the plant.
That afternoon, Josh went home, combined all the powder from all three bags, 
mixed it into a glass of water, and poured it into the plant’s soil. Sure enough, after 
a few hours, the Fintene, Rextor, and Tamphen combined in the plant’s roots, 
blocking the flow of nutrients to the plant, and the plant died.
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Figure D. Plant Food Overdose Vignette (Low-Blame Version of Burrage): 
Statutory, But-For, and Substantial Factor Causation Ascription (N = 470)
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